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Abstract 
 
A shortage of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households in job-rich 
suburbs is one of the biggest obstacles to upward mobility for those households, yet our 
understanding of the factors influencing the distribution of affordable housing 
development is weak.  Focusing on suburbs in Hennepin County, Minnesota, I use 
qualitative case studies of eight cities and a statistical analysis of 39 to demonstrate that 
the geography of economic incentives to develop affordable units has the strongest 
influence.  Contrary to common beliefs, opposition of middle-class suburbanites to 
affordable housing is a weak factor.  Public policy should therefore focus on altering 
economic incentives. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 For centuries, the idea that the United States is a land of limitless opportunity 
where even the most downtrodden can become wealthy if they work hard enough has 
dominated the national psyche, drawing people from all parts of the world hoping to have 
their chance at material success.  Undoubtedly, many have prospered in the United States, 
yet the powerful ideal of endless opportunity belies the fact that tens of millions of people 
cannot even meet their basic needs and have little chance of upward mobility.  Over ten 
percent of the population lives in poverty, leaving those individuals unable to afford 
simple healthcare, quality housing, and in many cases even enough food to adequately 
feed their families.  The higher education that would offer the surest opportunity for 
escaping poverty is completely out of reach.  An even larger portion of society may be 
able to meet its basic needs, but faces enormous obstacles to further advancement due to 
the high costs of post-secondary education and housing, the replacement of many 
moderate-wage industrial jobs with low-wage service jobs, and major debt burdens 
incurred from medical and other emergencies. 
Among the obstacles, a severe shortage of lower-cost housing is one of the 
biggest preventing many households from meeting their basic needs and achieving 
upward mobility.  The most profound consequences of the shortage are for low- and very 
low-income households, which are defined as those earning below 50 percent of an area 
median income (AMI) and below 30 percent of an AMI, respectively.  They are often 
forced to spend such a large portion of their incomes on housing that they are at great risk 
of becoming homeless as a result of even a small change in income and have no 
possibility of saving money for improved housing, education, or other investments (U.S. 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development 2007).  Furthermore, with jobs 
increasingly being located in suburbs with high housing costs, low-income households 
often experience a ―spatial mismatch‖ in which they live at great distance from most jobs, 
significantly limiting their employment prospects (Cervero 1989; Kain 1968).  In addition, 
the only neighborhoods in which many low-income households can afford to live have 
high crime, unemployment, and welfare dependency, all conditions that appear to 
negatively impact the educational achievement and future career outcomes of children 
growing up in those areas (Ellen and Turner 1997).  For moderate-income households, 
which are those earning between 50 and 80 percent of an AMI, the issue is less about 
finding housing they can afford, but rather finding it in the areas with the most job and 
educational opportunities.  For the city as a whole, having many people commute long 
distances from their homes to work increases traffic, which in turn increases pollution 
and decreases worker productivity (Cervero 1989). 
 There is thus a major public interest in expanding the supplies of both rental and 
owner-occupied affordable housing, especially in suburban areas.  In an effort to expand 
affordable housing supplies in suburban areas, county, metropolitan, and state 
governments, as well as the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) have enacted many policies such as building public housing, 
subsidizing private development, and requiring cities to develop a certain number of 
affordable units, yet there remains an acute shortage of lower-cost housing in many of 
these areas (Dreier et al. 2001; HUD and U.S. Department of Commerce 2008).  One 
reason for the shortcoming of many policies may be the poor understanding of affordable 
housing development dynamics in suburban areas.  Some researchers have explained the 
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suburban shortage as a consequence of economic incentives that cause cities to favor 
higher-cost housing and higher-income people at the expense of lower-cost housing 
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1983; Gyourko 1991).  Others have argued that opposition from 
middle-class suburban residents to lower-cost housing, known as Not-In-My-Backyard 
syndrome (NIMBYism) is to blame (Danielson 1976).  Evidence suggests that both play 
a role, but researchers have made few efforts to integrate both explanations across a 
metropolitan area and to determine how they interact with each other.  Without a 
thorough understanding of the factors that influence the development and placement of 
affordable housing at the metropolitan scale, we cannot expect policies that try to 
encourage development in suburban areas to be effective. 
 I approach this issue through a study of affordable housing development between 
2000 and 2007 in the suburban cities of Hennepin County, Minnesota, the largest and 
most populous county in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  For the remainder of this 
paper, I will use the definition of ―affordable‖ used by the Metropolitan Council, the 
regional government of the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  Under the current 
Metropolitan Council (2009) definition, a rental unit is affordable if a household earning 
50 percent of the AMI can rent it monthly for 30 percent or less of its monthly income.  
The thresholds are adjusted for unit size.  In 2007, the AMI was $78,500, so an efficiency 
unit was considered affordable at $687 per month, a one bedroom at $736 per month, a 
two bedroom at $883 per month, and a three bedroom or larger at $1,020 per month.  An 
ownership unit is affordable if a household earning 80 percent of the AMI spends 30 
percent or less of its monthly income on housing costs.  In 2007 a unit costing less than 
$206,800 qualified as affordable. 
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I will draw on the political economy of place framework of development, which 
attempts to explain how the interaction of political and economic factors across space 
produces particular development outcomes.  In all iterations of the theory, there is 
recognition that economic forces play an important role in structuring development, but 
that politics not based in economic considerations also impact decisions.  At the same 
time though, the framework holds that neither element is autonomous of the other, but 
that instead both influence each other in ultimately shaping what development occurs and 
how it occurs.  It assumes that the balance of forces affecting development changes over 
space, so by comparing the geography of such forces, it is possible to understand why 
different development outcomes for affordable housing occur in different cities.  Using 
the political economy of place framework, I will investigate the following research 
questions: 
 
1) What are the major factors influencing the development and placement of 
affordable housing at the metropolitan scale? 
2) Can resident opposition be broadly effective in blocking affordable housing 
development?  If so, under what circumstances is it effective? 
3) Is there intent by suburban cities to exclude affordable housing? 
4) Is there continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that influence the 
development and placement of affordable housing that a model can describe? 
 
I have drawn the conclusions of this study from a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods.  Based on quantitative data about each city‘s production of 
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affordable housing between 2000 and 2007, need for additional affordable housing as of 
2000, and tax capacity per capita in 2000, I developed an eight-category typology of 
cities, and from each category I systematically selected one city on which to conduct a 
case study.  In each case study, I reviewed city documents and newspaper articles, and 
then interviewed individuals familiar with affordable housing dynamics in that city.  
Once I completed the case studies, I conducted a correlation and regression analysis of 
data for all cities in the study area in order to test conclusions drawn from the case studies. 
 Based on my results, I advance an argument that largely supports the economic 
explanation for the continued shortage of affordable housing but also recognizes and 
clarifies a role for non-economic considerations.  In Hennepin County, it is clear that 
cities generally are motivated first by maintaining or improving their fiscal situation and 
keeping taxes low and second by maintaining the architectural status quo for residential 
areas.  While NIMBYism can in some cases significantly alter or block an affordable 
housing development, it is not a major explanatory factor in Hennepin County during the 
study period.  Only in limited cases when affordable housing is architecturally vastly 
different than the housing that is already in the community, is there an actual intent to 
exclude it.  Because maintaining fiscal standing is the primary concern of most cities, 
adequate financial incentives are often sufficient to spur affordable housing development.  
However, subsidies appear to favor infill development, which is development that occurs 
on previously developed land, in areas that already have large affordable housing stocks, 
not greenfield development, which is development on previously undeveloped land, in 
the areas with the highest need.  In the Twin Cities then, public policy should focus on 
better targeting subsidies to the areas of highest affordable housing need.  Future research 
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should test the applicability of my findings to other metropolitan areas in order to 
determine if such a policy would be effective throughout the country. 
I present the results and make my argument in five chapters that will follow this 
introduction.  In Chapter Two, I review literature related to affordable housing.  In that 
chapter, I demonstrate that there is a suburban shortage of affordable housing, present the 
arguments in favor of increasing the supply in suburbs, detail the various explanations for 
why development remains difficult, and then introduce the political economy of place 
framework upon which I have based this research.  In Chapter Three, I present 
background information on affordable housing development in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area and Hennepin County, and then explain my data and research methods.  
In Chapter Four, I present the results of the eight case studies and the statistical analysis.  
In Chapter Five I analyze the results.  Finally in Chapter Six, I conclude by offering 
policy prescriptions and avenues for future research. 
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Literature Review 
Introduction 
 There is extensive research devoted to the broad forces that have shaped and 
continue to shape the development of American metropolitan areas, yet the more specific 
forces that influence the distribution and amount of affordable housing development are 
less clear.  Data demonstrate that there is indeed a present shortage of affordable housing 
and literature does an excellent job of establishing past economic, political, and social 
forces that have helped create this shortage as well as the contemporary reasons why it 
should be reduced.  However, literature falls short of comprehensively explaining the 
continued difficulty of developing affordable housing in suburban areas because the 
relevant studies are ultimately outdated, anecdotal, or only partially related to affordable 
housing.  Consequently, policymakers have an inadequate knowledge base from which to 
craft effective policies to encourage future development of both owner-occupied and 
rental affordable housing units in suburbs. 
The political economy of place framework provides a useful foundation upon 
which to build a more refined understanding of the metropolitan dynamics of affordable 
housing development.  It argues that both economics and politics play an important role 
in development and integrates the two by proposing the conditions that influence the 
balance of dominance between them.  Furthermore, it calls our attention to how such 
forces vary over space, making it ideal for use in a geographic study.  It therefore 
provides a firm basis for investigating the broad range of actors and forces beyond simple 
economics that the literature loosely suggests plays a role in affordable housing dynamics 
and begins to offer possible explanations for how those forces interact. 
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The Case for Expanding Suburban Supplies of Affordable Housing 
A dominant feature of the American housing market is a general failure to 
accommodate the needs of a significant portion of low- and moderate-income people.  
First, the demand for low-income housing far exceeds the supply.  In 2005, 5.73 million 
households that earned below 50 percent of the AMI where they lived were severely rent 
burdened, meaning they spent over 50 percent of their monthly income on rent.  HUD 
and many housing experts believe that housing costs that exceed 30 percent of a 
household‘s monthly income are dangerously high because small changes in income 
could easily force the household into homelessness or cause it to go without basic 
necessities (HUD 2007).  Second, as Table 2.1 below demonstrates, the shortage of 
affordable housing is disproportionately acute in suburban areas.  It shows the number of 
housing units, in thousands, in each monthly cost category in central cities and suburbs.  
It covers all metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States for the year 2007.  
The expected value represents the number of units in each cost category that an area 
would have if, keeping the number of total units constant, it had a proportionately equal 
share of the units in that category.  In every category over $1,000, suburbs have a 
disproportionately large number of units.  It is important to note that because the 
threshold for affordability is based on the AMI of an MSA and AMIs vary by MSA, these 
data are not a direct representation of the number of affordable units in each area.  
Nevertheless, the data provide a striking picture of the geography of housing costs in the 
United States. 
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Table 2.1:  Distribution of Housing by Price and Location in Metropolitan Areas, 2007 
 Central Cities Suburbs 
Monthly Housing Cost Expected Actual Percent 
Difference 
Expected Actual Percent 
Difference 
Total (in thousands) 31,602 31,302 0.00 52,062 52,062 0.00 
No cash rent 556 607 9.17 916 865 -5.57 
$1-$499 6,628 7,322 10.47 10,919 10,225 -6.36 
$500-$999 10,543 11,862 12.51 17,371 16,051 -7.60 
$1,000-$1,499 6,389 6,009 -5.95 10,526 10,906 3.61 
$1,500-$1,999 3,278 2,623 -19.98 5,400 6,055 12.13 
$2,000-$2,499 1,706 1,313 -23.04 2,810 3,203 13.99 
$2,500 or more 2,501 1,864 -25.47 4,121 4,758 15.46 
             (Source:  HUD and U.S. Department of Commerce 2008) 
As the data presented above begin to suggest, the need to expand affordable 
housing supplies, especially in suburban areas, is strong.  One of the principal arguments 
in favor of an expanded suburban supply of affordable housing is the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis, which Kain (1968) first proposed in a paper about employment of African 
Americans in Chicago and Detroit.  By demonstrating that they were employed in smaller 
numbers than their population size would suggest in areas more distant from major 
concentrations of African Americans, he showed that the inability to access housing in 
most suburban areas due to discrimination and affordability constraints limited the 
employment opportunities of inner-city blacks, resulting in high unemployment and 
diminished opportunities to escape poverty.  Recent work by McLafferty and Preston 
(1996) showed that based on commute times, whites and Latinos in all areas of northern 
New Jersey did not experience a spatial-mismatch, whereas inner-city African Americans 
did, with women experiencing a more severe spatial mismatch than men.  No suburban 
groups experienced a spatial mismatch, indicating that simply living in a suburb offers 
increased job opportunities.  Preston and McLafferty (1999) reinforce the latter finding 
by noting that recent spatial mismatch research has supported the contention that spatial 
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mismatches impact employment, though the research has been inconclusive on the 
strength of the impact. 
While the above discussion focuses exclusively on race and gender, its 
applicability to low- and moderate-income people is obvious.  In fact, Cervero (1989) 
demonstrates that in the Chicago and San Francisco areas, there is a spatial mismatch for 
many workers and that it is worsening because jobs are increasingly located in suburban 
areas while at the same time the housing costs in those suburbs preclude many of the 
workers from living there.  For low-income people without cars, commuting to suburban 
jobs may be impossible, effectively shutting them out of the most vibrant job markets, 
just as was the case with African Americans when Kain was writing.  Furthermore, a 
central part of Cervero‘s argument is that widening spatial-mismatches due to insufficient 
affordable housing supplies is the primary factor resulting in increased traffic congestion, 
a problem that impacts not just low-income people, but nearly all metropolitan residents.  
Finally, essential but lower-wage city employees such as teachers, police officers, and 
firefighters may be unable to find housing in some suburbs, which in turn makes it more 
difficult for those suburbs to hire such employees (Duncan and Duncan 2006). 
The advantages to reducing the spatial mismatch by increasing supplies of 
affordable housing in suburbs are therefore very clear.  For a metropolitan area as a 
whole, it would mean less traffic, which would equate to higher worker productivity, less 
pollution, and a higher quality of life for many people.  For some cities, it would make 
hiring city employees easier.  For lower-income people, it may increase their levels of 
employment and possibly reduce poverty.  Indeed, an extensive study of the Gautreaux 
program in Chicago supports such a contention.  The program emerged from a lawsuit 
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settlement in 1976 in which HUD and public housing agencies in the Chicago area 
recognized that concentrating subsidized low-income housing in certain areas of the 
central city was racially discriminatory and agreed to provide Section 8 housing vouchers 
so that program participants could live in market-rate apartments in locations of their 
choosing in both the central city and suburbs.  Through the Section 8 program HUD 
subsidizes the rents of low-income households in market-rate apartments by paying the 
difference between the rent and 30 percent of the household‘s monthly income.  Over 
5,000 families have now participated in the Gautreaux program, and those that have 
chosen to relocate to suburbs have higher employment and their children do better in 
school than those families that choose to remain in predominantly African American 
inner-city neighborhoods (Rosenbaum 1995). 
A major part of the success of the Gautreaux program is likely the simple fact that 
it put many poor individuals in closer proximity to jobs, but it may also be because of less 
tangible ―neighborhood effects‖ of relocating to more stable and affluent areas.  For 
decades, researchers have considered the possibility that the impacts of a neighborhood‘s 
socioeconomic status on the lives of its residents exceed what would be expected based 
on residents‘ current socioeconomic status because of the varying behavioral norms and 
social networks that exist in neighborhoods of different socioeconomic classes.  
Proponents of the neighborhood effects argument hold that neighborhoods of higher 
socioeconomic class have residents with behaviors more conducive to long-term 
educational and economic success and social networks that provide more support and 
connections to job opportunities.  Ellen and Turner (1997) conducted a review of the 
extensive literature related to neighborhood effects and found for adolescents a strong 
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positive relationship between neighborhood and educational attainment, a moderately 
positive relationship for employment, a moderately negative relationship for sexual 
activity and pregnancy, and a weakly negative relationship for crime.  Neighborhood 
appears to influence adults‘ employment prospects, though there have been far fewer 
studies of the topic.  Rosenbaum‘s (1995) study of the Gautreaux program is a clear 
example of Ellen‘s and Turner‘s broader findings.  Not only did adults in more affluent 
suburban areas achieve higher employment rates, but their children tended to do better in 
school.  A later ethnographic study of single women who moved to suburbs as 
participants in the Gautreaux program provides support for the idea that social networks 
have a tangible effect on opportunity (Rosenbaum et al. 2005).  It found that their new 
suburban neighbors were far more willing and able than their former urban neighbors to 
offer to watch children if they were at work late, provide material assistance in difficult 
times, and bring the women to work if their cars were broken.  The women felt that the 
strong suburban support networks helped them and their children to improve their life 
opportunities.  Increased supplies of affordable housing in suburban areas would help 
many low-income people take advantage of positive neighborhood effects. 
Finally, expanded suburban supplies of affordable housing would also be an 
indirect but effective way of addressing the problem of concentrated poverty in the 
central city.  Wilson (1987) argues that the concentration of joblessness and poverty in 
small areas makes it extremely difficult for residents of such areas to escape poverty 
because ―people experience social isolation that excludes them from the job network 
system that permeates other neighborhoods‖ (p. 57) and because concentration ―generates 
behavior not conducive to good work histories‖ (p. 60) since residents are accustomed to 
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casual work instead of regular long-term work.  At the time he was writing, the 
concentration of poverty in the United States was peaking, with 21.8 percent of people in 
poverty living in census tracts with over 20 percent of the population being in poverty in 
1990.  By the 2000 Census, that statistic had declined to 19.5 percent, but that is only a 
slight decline (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).  High levels of poverty, particularly 
concentrated poverty, also have a negative impact on central cities as a whole because 
impoverished residents require larger quantities of expensive services such as health 
clinics and housing than wealthier populations.  High service expenditures can result in 
fiscal difficulties in cities with high levels of poverty (Orfield 2002).  Increased suburban 
supplies of affordable housing would help to reduce poverty concentration by providing 
new residential locations for current residents of high poverty areas and would ease the 
fiscal difficulties that cities with large impoverished populations face by distributing the 
need for services more evenly across metropolitan areas. 
 
Toward Explaining the Suburban Shortage of Affordable Housing 
 A complicated web of social, political, and economic forces helped to establish 
and perpetuate the present geography of affordable housing in American cities.  Though 
small-scale suburbanization began as early as the late 1800s in many American cities, it 
began at a massive scale in the years immediately following World War II as a result of 
subsidy programs established by the federal government during the Great Depression.  
The Home Owners Loan Corporation, established in 1933, refinanced at low interest rates 
with longer repayment periods over one million loans that were in default.  The following 
year, the federal government greatly expanded its involvement in the housing market by 
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establishing the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  Instead of directly financing 
lending, the FHA guaranteed many mortgages issued by private banks, greatly increasing 
lending, further lowering interest rates, and extending the repayment period to 25 to 30 
years.  The net result of FHA programs over the next three decades was a sharp increase 
in housing construction and home ownership (Jackson 1985). 
 Development was, however, spatially uneven and strongly favored white, middle-
class households.  The FHA engaged in a practice of rating the lending risk of an area, 
and refused to guarantee loans in areas labeled as high risk.  The FHA considered any 
inner-city areas, and any area that was predominantly African American high risk though, 
meaning that the FHA favored fringe development in primarily white areas.  Private 
banks began using the practice, known as redlining, even when they were not taking 
advantage of FHA loan guarantees, further restricting development to predominantly 
suburban areas.  Then, in 1956, President Eisenhower signed the Federal Highway Act, 
initiating the construction of the Interstate Highway System.  By providing easy access to 
the exurban fringe, interstates greatly accelerated suburban housing development, 
although due to discriminatory lending practices, living in suburbs continued to be an 
option, for the most part, only to middle-class whites (Jackson 1985).  With the initially 
middle-class character of post-war suburbia established, many suburban municipalities 
and their residents actively tried to exclude housing that might attract the poor.  In the 
decades immediately preceding and following World War II, many states passed 
legislation allowing suburban areas to incorporate as municipalities separate from the 
central city, and thousands did so.  Empowered to determine land-use regulation, many 
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restricted minimum lot size and prohibited apartment development in order to exclude 
cheaper housing that would attract low-income populations (Jackson 1985). 
In recent decades, highway construction has slowed, redlining and discriminatory 
real-estate practices have become illegal, and many states as well as the federal 
government have made efforts to expand the supply of affordable housing in suburban 
areas (Dreier et al. 2001), though the suburban shortage persists.  Furthermore, evidence 
suggests that municipalities continue to use a variety of methods to exclude or discourage 
the development of affordable housing.  In 1991, the Advisory Commission on 
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing declared, ―In community after community 
across the country, local governments employ zoning and subdivision ordinances, 
building codes and permitting procedures to prevent development of affordable housing‖ 
(p. 3).  HUD reiterated the findings of the panel‘s 1991 report in a 2005 report, and added 
stringent environmental regulations as another tool that municipalities now use to restrict 
affordable housing development. 
HUD‘s findings inevitably reflect the urban policy agendas of the presidential 
administrations that commission them, yet independent empirical evidence largely 
corroborates the claim that suburban municipalities have the ability to restrict the 
development of affordable housing.  In a review of the extensive literature on this topic, 
Ihlanfeldt (2004) concludes that restricting development and enacting characteristics 
zoning, which is specifying characteristics of development beyond simply the land use, 
increases the cost of housing and thus reduces affordability.  The effect may be 
particularly strong for rental units, which house the majority of low-income urban and 
suburban residents.  Levine‘s (1999) examination of growth controls across California 
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found that limiting the amount of development that could take place in an area strongly 
discouraged local rental housing development and pushed it to less controlled areas.  As a 
result, minority and low-income residents moved in large numbers to areas with less 
stringent regulation, indicating that regulation can effectively exclude affordable rental 
housing and accordingly the populations that live in it.  However, the patterns described 
above are not universal.  Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) find that only in certain areas with 
very high real-estate values, such as California and the Northeast, upon which many of 
the studies described above focus, do zoning regulations have a large effect on housing 
prices.  The critical point, however, is that municipalities can effectively use regulation to 
exclude affordable housing.  Two dominant explanations exist in the literature to explain 
why suburbs would continue to try to exclude it. 
 One argues that exclusion is a symptom of fiscal incentives to favor more 
expensive housing units.  Fainstein and Fainstein (1983, p. 251) succinctly describe the 
basis of the economic explanation: 
U.S. cities raise the majority of their revenue locally, with property taxes 
the most important source.  While municipalities differ considerably in the 
per-capita magnitude of their expenditures, the system of finance compels 
every local state to at least maintain its revenue base by attracting 
investment which contributes to the market value of real property.  
Moreover, because lower-income populations contribute much less to 
revenue than they do to expenditures, local states (even those with 
majorities of poor people), have an interest in excluding such households. 
 
Not only does the explanation argue that it is in the economic interests of cities to exclude 
low-income people, but it also holds that it is in a city‘s interest to exclude higher density 
development, which tends to be more affordable than low-density housing.  This results 
from the fact that property taxes yield similar revenue for a given parcel regardless of the 
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residential density of that parcel, assuming that the parcel is being used to its maximum 
potential.  For services such as schools and infrastructure whose costs are determined by 
the number of people they serve, higher density development, which is often more 
affordable, yields less in taxes per person than lower density development.  This situation 
creates an incentive for cities to raise minimum lot sizes, which can exclude 
development.  If the city chooses not to increase the minimum lot size, it may have to 
raise taxes, which makes it less competitive for attracting businesses and residents, which 
in turn has a negative impact on the tax base (Gyourko 1991). 
 Empirical evidence for the economic explanation is strong.  Rolleston (1987) 
examined zoning decisions for vacant land in 360 municipalities in northeastern New 
Jersey.  She found that when a larger portion of a city‘s tax base came from non-
residential uses, which typically yield more taxes per given amount of land than 
residential uses, the city allocated less vacant land to any residential uses.  Furthermore, 
the land that was allocated as residential was more restrictive in the types of units that 
could be built on it, which restricted affordability of new units.  Additionally, she found 
that the ratio of a city‘s total fiscal capacity to the fiscal capacity of adjacent cities is a 
statistically significant predictor of how much vacant land a city zones as residential and 
how restrictively zoned that residential land is.  Cities with smaller fiscal capacities 
relative to neighboring cities tended to zone less vacant land for residential uses and the 
land that was zoned for residential uses was zoned more restrictively.  A study of 132 
cities in Connecticut again found that larger proportions of non-residential land-uses 
correlated negatively with the amount of vacant land zoned as residential, though the 
effect was small (Bates and Santerre 1994).  Finally, two studies found that the use of 
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impact fees, which theoretically eliminate the fiscal impact of higher density residential 
development, increase construction of multi-family and single-family units.  This 
suggests that affordable units face fewer obstacles to construction when impact fees 
remove the fiscal disincentive to allow higher density housing (Burge and Ihlanfeldt 
2006a; Burge and Ihlanfeldt 2006b). 
 The other dominant explanation for the suburban shortage of affordable units is 
NIMBYism against affordable housing, which results in local governments attempting to 
exclude it.  Though NIMBYism outwardly usually focuses on property value, service, 
and quality of life issues (Pendall 1999), many observers have long contended that racism 
and class biases underlie it.  Danielson (1976, p. 6) influentially argued from this 
perspective when he wrote, ―Middle-class families commonly equate personal security, 
good schools, maintenance of property values, and the general desirability of a residential 
area with the absence of lower-income groups.‖  He argues that class is intertwined in the 
minds of many whites with race when he writes, ―Large numbers of whites identify 
almost all blacks with poverty, crime, broken families, and other undesirable 
characteristics of lower-class populations‖ (p. 11).  Exclusionary zoning provisions, 
which are those that restrict the development of lower-income housing, as well as 
stringent building codes, strict code enforcement, and outright exclusion of subsidized 
housing helped maintain economic and racial segregation.  Though he recognizes that 
fiscal considerations may motivate such policies to some extent, he attributes them 
primarily to the desire of suburban residents to maintain the economic and racial 
character of their suburbs. 
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 Indeed, there is strong historical evidence and some more recent evidence 
supporting Danielson‘s argument.  First, at least until the time Danielson wrote his book, 
many whites had systematically excluded blacks from predominantly white 
neighborhoods.  Through practices such as redlining, intimidation, and violence, the 
federal government, banks, neighborhood associations, and white individuals had 
established and maintained a highly racially segregated residential pattern (Danielson 
1976; Massey and Denton 1993; Sugrue 2005).  There is significant debate about the 
present impacts of racism on real-estate market dynamics, but there is limited evidence 
that it may still play a role in NIMBYism.  In her study of New Jersey cities, Rolleston 
(1987) found that cities that had smaller minority populations than their surrounding 
areas had more restrictive residential land-use zoning.  There is also evidence suggesting 
that class bias may still provoke NIMBY opposition.  Bates‘ and Santerre‘s (1994) study 
of Connecticut cities found that cities with a smaller population of residents in poverty 
than surrounding areas were more likely to zone vacant land for non-residential uses, 
most likely to exclude future low-income housing development. 
 At the same time though, many other researchers have contended that the 
expressed objections are a true reflection of the beliefs of residents.  The best 
documented examples of NIMBYism are those focusing on environmental concerns 
posed by facilities such as industrial plants or waste dumps (Schively 2007).  In such 
cases, it is unlikely that opposition is based on anything other than concern for health and 
quality of life within a neighborhood.  Fischel (2001) extends the argument for less 
nefarious sources of NIMBYism beyond environmental considerations.  He presents the 
compelling hypothesis that opposition may simply be a rational economic response to the 
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uncertainty of whether a new land-use will diminish property values.  Though research in 
Baltimore County, Maryland actually showed new rental units made affordable through 
HUD‘s Section 8 program increased property values slightly in surrounding areas when 
they were present in low concentrations, if residents are acting without that knowledge or 
are not convinced by it, the objections they express are an accurate reflection of their 
motivations (Galster et al. 2003). 
Though evidence exists for both arguments, it is extremely difficult to evaluate 
residents‘ true motivations in relation to NIMBYism towards affordable housing.  Most 
importantly, there is very little work focusing directly on NIMBYism and housing 
(Schively 2007).  The most closely applicable body of work focuses on the placement of 
human services facilities such as group homes and AIDS clinics.  Researchers in this 
field have found, however, that levels of opposition vary greatly by national region and 
location in metropolitan areas, as well as the political orientation of communities (Segal 
et al. 1980; Takahashi and Dear 1997).  The implication is that predicting a NIMBY 
response is difficult, and it is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about what motivates 
people to mount such a response and what types of people are more likely to do so. 
Two of the only studies that do address NIMBYism and housing directly highlight 
the difficulty of separating race or class discrimination from more socially acceptable 
concerns.  The first found that out of 182 housing developments studied in the San 
Francisco Bay area, in only one case did someone object to a development on the grounds 
that it included subsidized affordable housing.  Most complaints focused on 
environmental, infrastructural, or aesthetic concerns.  However, opposition was 38 
percent more likely to emerge when affordable units were included (Pendall 1999).  The 
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units may have simply presented to a greater extent the issues about which existing 
residents were concerned, or residents may have been masking discrimination with more 
tenable complaints. 
An extended case study of the wealthy New York City suburb of Bedford found 
that even though policies meant to maintain a rural aesthetic directly excluded Latino 
immigrants and the poor, most residents did not recognize this in interviews and were 
hesitant to support changing policies.  The authors write in relation to exclusionary land 
use regulations, ―[I]n fact the goal is not always social exclusion in itself but to preserve 
the ‗look of the landscape,‘ which is central to the performance of particular social 
identities that depend on lifestyle, consumption patterns, and aesthetic sensibilities‖ (p. 
159).  A focus on aesthetic concerns allows residents to ignore the exclusionary impacts 
of their political decisions.  While their aesthetic concerns are genuine, they are also 
intertwined with issues of class and ethnicity of which residents may or may not be 
conscious (Duncan and Duncan 2006). 
A major issue with the NIMBY argument, however, is that it may not be as 
serious of an issue as much of the literature suggests.  Lang et al. (2008) cite several 
recent real-estate surveys that find that people would support affordable housing in their 
neighborhoods if it fit in with the neighborhood.  While the authors recognize that 
NIMBYism can be an issue, they believe the larger obstacle to affordable housing 
development is that housing costs are simply not a major national political issue because 
highly visible housing programs are targeted only at a small, very poor group, 
minimizing the importance of the programs to the larger middle-class constituency.  The 
researchers find evidence that housing costs are growing in importance in people‘s 
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minds, but at the moment there is little national political will to address the issue of 
affordable housing.  The author‘s argument cannot negate the NIMBYism explanation, 
but it does give reason to approach the argument with caution and skepticism. 
Both the economic and NIMBYism arguments provide useful foundations for 
analysis of affordable housing dynamics, but the bodies of literature that form them are 
problematic for developing a clear understanding of the factors that influence affordable 
housing production.  First, the majority of the literature for both arguments assumes that 
cities have the intent to exclude.  In cases of NIMBYism, that assumption is probably 
valid, but in the case of economic constraints, a city may simply be responding to an 
incentive to have one type of housing development versus another instead of actively 
deciding to exclude affordable housing because of the fiscal consequences of having it.  
Second, much of the literature, especially that related to NIMBYism, is two to three 
decades old.  In many other situations, age might not be a problem, but we can expect 
attitudes towards racial minorities and lower socioeconomic classes to change over time.  
Lastly, almost none of the literature deals directly with affordable housing.  Only Pendall 
(1999) studies it explicitly, whereas most of the other literature is only partially related.  
Consequently, the available evidence does not adequately explain the factors that 
influence the quantity and location of affordable housing development.  Several 
theoretical arguments offer some additional, albeit imperfect, insight into those factors. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Affordable Housing Development 
 The supposed influence of both economic constraints and political opposition on 
the development and placement of affordable housing points to the complexity involved 
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in uncovering the dynamics of affordable housing development at the metropolitan scale.  
In order to reduce the complexity, it is necessary to begin with a broad analytical 
framework that accommodates the dual nature of affordable housing development in 
providing a model for the development process.  More than any other theoretical 
approach, the political economy of place approach can do this.  In its most essential form, 
political economy of place is the view that in urban development the economy and 
politics are not separate spheres operating independently of each other, but rather that 
politics is an arena that shapes the economy, while at the same time the economy 
constrains the spectrum of political activity and may encourage politics to proceed in 
particular directions.  By rejecting the idea that the economy is a force independent of 
human action, the political economy framework implicitly accepts some level of human 
agency in determining the course of development and therefore attempts to address 
questions about who or what has power in the development process. 
 Logan and Molotch (1987) sketch the basic premises of political economy of 
place by arguing that a fundamental characteristic of places is that they have both use and 
exchange values.  Use values are those non-economic benefits that actors derive from a 
place, whereas exchange values are the economic benefits.  Favoring one often 
diminishes the other, so there is a constant struggle between actors interested in use 
values and actors interested in exchange values, which ascribes a fundamentally political 
character to development.  For instance, established residents often oppose new housing 
developments on the grounds that those developments will make the area more congested 
and diminish the rural character the area had when they moved to it (Pendall 1999).  The 
developers would profit economically, but the quality of life of existing residents might 
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decline.  A political struggle also occurs within the group of actors pursuing exchange 
values.  The authors write (p. 24), ―Property prices go down as well as up, but less 
because of what entrepreneurs do with their own holdings than because of the changing 
relations among properties.‖  Place entrepreneurs, who are actors with an interest in a 
particular geographic place, therefore have an incentive to channel growth in a fashion 
that their holdings increase in value, which in turn hurts the value of other place 
entrepreneurs‘ holdings.  Because government regulates land use, ―the elite can mobilize 
the government to bolster growth goals‖ (p. 35). 
 Beyond simply accounting for the interaction between politics and economics, 
political economy of place also succeeds at explaining the geographic variation in that 
interaction.  The non-uniformity of the geography of affordable housing development 
demonstrates that the political economy of place is acting differently across space.  
Though Logan and Molotch (1987) offer a very specific group of possible actors 
involved in the political economy of place, which I will explain in a moment, an implicit 
argument of their work is that each actor‘s influence depends on the strength of its tie to a 
geographic place and its relative prominence in that place.  Variation in local 
circumstances will thus lead to different development outcomes.  Whereas an economic 
study might require only a macro-understanding of the forces affecting housing 
development, a study such as mine focusing specifically on the location of development 
must be able to account for this variation.  It is for this reason that geographers continue 
to draw on the political economy of place framework to explain the geography of urban 
policy (Martin et al. 2003), and why I have also decided to do so.  However, researchers 
do not agree on the dynamics of political economy of place. 
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Logan and Molotch (1987) refer to their specific interpretation of political 
economy of place as the growth machine.  Molotch (1976, p. 309-310) first proposed the 
concept when he wrote, ―I speculate that the political and economic essence of virtually 
any given locality, in the present American context, is growth.‖  He writes (p. 313) that 
growth ―is not the only function of government, but the key one.‖  A key point though is 
that governments seek growth because of the presence of a growth machine that demands 
it, not because of bare economic necessity.  In a later work, Logan and Molotch (1987) 
articulate the concept in much more detailed terms.  In it, they define the growth machine 
as, ―[a]n apparatus of interlocking progrowth associations and governmental units‖ that 
stand to gain economically and politically from growth in a particular place (Logan and 
Molotch 1987, p. 32).  Utilities, businesses, and rentiers, who are actors deriving profits 
directly from land, are the most important pieces of the growth machine because of the 
substantial profits they directly receive from growth.  Governments often view growth as 
a means of getting ahead in competition with other cities, so they also have a major place.  
Finally, politicians often rely on other growth machine actors for funding campaigns, so 
they stand to gain from growth. 
From the growth machine idea emerges a highly curtailed picture of individual 
agency.  Pointedly, residents, who the authors argue derive primarily use values from 
place, are not part of the growth machine.  In fact, the authors contend that growth 
machines pursue ―value-free development‖, which is ―the notion that free markets alone 
should determine land use,‖ leading to degradation of the use values residents favor 
(Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 32).  The authors concede that residents are occasionally 
able to form neighborhood organizations that can challenge the desires of the growth 
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machine, but believe that typically ―elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any 
alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community‖ 
(Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 51).  Thus the components of the growth machine are 
extremely powerful and residents are very weak.  Accordingly, affordable housing 
development could occur under a growth machine, but only if it benefited its members.  
Affordable housing development is clearly not occurring at the rate necessary to satisfy 
demand, and while the growth machine would unequivocally argue that such is the case 
because affordable housing development generally must not be in the interests of the 
growth machine, it does not explain in detail why the interests of lower-income people 
are rarely in line with those of the elite that control development.  Stone‘s (1980; 1989; 
1993) articulation of regime theory provides a thorough argument related to the question. 
An early basis of his argument is stratification theory, in which he argues, 
―[P]ublic officials form their alliances, make their decisions and plan their futures in a 
context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged – that is, 
officials operate in a stratified society.  The system of stratification is a motivating factor 
in all that they do; it predisposes them to favor upper- over lower-strata interests‖ (Stone 
1980, p. 979).  Upper-strata interests have a disproportionately large influence because of 
their extensive economic resources, role as leaders of large organizations, and social 
prestige.  Furthermore, because government favors upper-strata interests, it is more 
difficult for other groups to even be heard in government, further discouraging their 
participation and consequently increasing the power of upper-strata interests.  As a result, 
upper-strata interests possess systemic power, which is ―that dimension of power in 
which durable features of the socioeconomic system…confer advantages and 
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disadvantages on groups…in ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at 
the expense of others‖ (Stone 1980, p. 980). 
From stratification theory emerges regime theory.  Stone (1989) presented the 
idea in an applied context in a book about post-World War II politics in Atlanta.  He 
argues that African American leaders formed a governing coalition, which he often refers 
to as a regime, with white business leaders that endured for decades.  It retained popular 
support by providing occasional benefits to the African American majority such as jobs 
or low-income housing construction.  Meanwhile, the city government strongly backed 
downtown redevelopment programs that led to huge profits for business leaders but 
displacement of many African American residents because business leaders had the 
power and resources to force government officials to back their interests.  Stone 
recognizes that the dominance of Atlanta‘s business community is more extreme than in 
many other cities, but it does highlight several theoretical points that he explains in detail 
in a later paper.  He writes (1993, p. 6), ―Urban regime theory assumes that the 
effectiveness of local government depends greatly on the cooperation of 
nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental 
resources.‖  He goes on to explain (p. 9): 
Transaction costs mean that established relationships have great value in 
facilitating future cooperation.  Hence, once formed, a relationship of 
cooperation becomes something of value to be protected by all of the 
participants.  Furthermore, because a governing coalition produces 
benefits it can share or withhold, being part of an established coalition 
confers preemptive advantages. 
 
Thus, once a regime exists that favors upper-strata interests, simple inertia helps that 
regime stay in power.  Nevertheless, even the dominant actors of the regime are 
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constrained, which Stone (p. 12) recognizes when he writes, ―[T]he ready availability of 
means rather than the will of dominant actors may explain what is pursued and why.‖  
However, implicit in his statement is that greater means confer greater power, resulting in 
most regimes favoring upper-strata interests to some extent. 
Peterson (1981) informs a structuralist interpretation of political economy of place 
by arguing that the economic structure rather than the upper-strata or growth machine 
interests determine the course of development.  His primary contention is that ―[c]ity 
politics is limited politics‖ (p. 4).  He writes, ―The place of the city within the larger 
political economy of the nation fundamentally affects the policy choices cities make.  In 
making these decisions, cities select those policies which are in the interests of the city, 
taken as a whole‖ (p. 4).  He later explains, ―[P]olicies and programs can be said to be in 
the interest of cities whenever the policies maintain or enhance the economic position, 
social prestige, or political power of the city‖ (p. 20).  He believes that economic position 
is the most important of these three concerns.  As a result, he writes, cities can pursue 
only to a very limited extent policies that benefit primarily people paying less than the 
average person in taxes.  Extensive implementation of such policies would result in 
increased taxes, which would cause a decline in a city‘s competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
cities and a subsequent decline in economic position, social prestige, and political power.  
The implications for affordable housing are profound.  If Peterson‘s argument held, it 
would be extremely difficult for cities to provide any kind of subsidy for affordable 
housing, which may be necessary in metropolitan areas in which high land values 
preclude affordable housing development.  Furthermore, he explicitly states that the 
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dominance of economic considerations is a powerful incentive to cities to exclude low-
income people since they require more services but pay fewer taxes. 
The critical flaw of structuralism is to assume that growth is the only viable policy 
option for cities.  Whereas Peterson (1981) argues that development is the best way to 
increase a city‘s economic position, Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) 
contend that large-scale development can actually be extremely costly.  For example, 
they point to the massive subsidies cities provide developers in the form of paying to 
extend infrastructure to previously un-served areas in order to make construction 
possible.  Molotch (1990) attacks structuralism from a slightly different angle when he 
presents case studies of three California cities in order to demonstrate that cities can 
shape development.  With varying success, the cities have been able to restrict growth, 
and when it occurs, to get exactions from developers to devote to programs such as low-
income housing.  Clavel and Kleniewski (1990) do not directly address housing, but 
make a similar point.  They highlight cities such as Boston and Chicago that, in exchange 
for allowing development, were able to get the developers to pay fees used for providing 
services to the poor or make commitments to hiring low-income local workers.  
Nevertheless, structuralism does make the valuable point that cities operate within a 
powerful economic structure that we cannot ignore in any analysis of city policies. 
 None of the scholars of political economy discussed above extensively addresses 
affordable housing development, and each of their approaches have some shortcomings, 
but as a whole, they provide an extremely useful theoretical framework with which to 
analyze the dynamics of affordable housing development in suburbs.  All assume and 
convincingly argue that economic forces play a preeminent role in housing development, 
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whether they are the economic constraints proposed by Peterson, the profit motive 
proposed by Logan and Molotch, or the political advantages conferred by economic 
resources proposed by Stone.  While their writings represent a range of views on the 
importance of the larger market structure versus the economic desires of wealthy 
individuals and companies, all maintain that in order to understand any kind of 
development, including affordable housing development, it is necessary to understand the 
economic forces at work.   
Political economy of place also informs the understanding of the political element 
of affordable housing development that is often addressed in applied literature in relation 
to NIMBYism.  All three perspectives discussed above assume that cities can make 
decisions based on non-economic considerations, although Peterson questions the long-
term fiscal sustainability of decisions that deliberately challenge market constraints.  
Logan and Molotch especially, but also to a lesser extent Stone, identify a number of 
discrete actors that make political decisions related to development, and all are actors 
who either themselves possess large economic resources or have the power to direct the 
flow of large amounts of public resources and benefits.  In none of the authors‘ views 
would small neighborhood groups that might oppose a development be particularly 
powerful.  As such, the three perspectives within political economy assume that 
economics and politics cannot be decoupled.  By integrating both the economic and 
political elements of the development process, the collective body of political economy 
of place literature avoids the shortcomings of applied literature that tend to address one 
element of the process in isolation from all others. 
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 A framework based around three ideas emerges that I will use to evaluate the 
dynamics of affordable housing development.  First, economic constraints and the profit 
motive will always play a role in affordable housing development.  Consequently, I will 
investigate the nature and magnitude of any constraints, as well as the economic interests 
of the actors involved in housing development in each city.  Second, there is a political 
element of affordable housing development that cannot be fully explained by economics 
but is intrinsically linked to it.  I will thus also focus on who or what the powerful actors 
in a city are and what influences each of them to make the decisions they do related to 
housing.  In relation to identifying powerful actors, it will be especially important to 
reconcile the discrepancy between the applied literature, which argues that NIMBYism is 
a powerful force in shaping affordable housing development, and theoretical literature, 
which ascribes very limited power to small groups of residents.  Finally, the interests of 
low-income people, the group most in need of affordable housing, hold little sway in the 
political economy of affordable housing development.  Accordingly, I will identify the 
motives of powerful actors for developing affordable housing and will use those as a lens 
into the economic and political considerations that I identified previously. 
 
Conclusion 
 A synthesis of the literature related to affordable housing development raises a 
number of important questions that I will work to address in this paper.  First, though 
many researchers have noted various constraints on affordable housing development, 
they tend to identify a constraint in isolation without assessing the other factors that are 
also present.  Accordingly, the literature leaves unclear what the major factors 
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influencing the development and placement of affordable housing are at the metropolitan 
scale.  Second, the small place reserved for NIMBYism in the broad models of 
development politics means it will be important to assess whether NIMBYism is broadly 
effective and, if so, under what circumstances that is the case.  Third, the NIMBY 
literature uncritically assumes intent to exclude affordable housing, so it will be 
important to determine if that intent exists.  Finally, the implication that there is 
continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that influence development, albeit with 
the strength of each factor varying across space, deserves investigation.    The magnitude 
of the above questions demonstrates that an in-depth study of affordable housing 
dynamics at a large scale is both justified and necessary.  Addressing them in the context 
of Hennepin County, Minnesota will thus bridge a number of major gaps in our 
understanding of affordable housing development. 
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Chapter Three:  Research Context, Data, and Methods 
Hennepin County and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area 
 This study focuses on Hennepin County in the Minneapolis – St. Paul – 
Bloomington MSA, also known as the Twin Cities.  According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2009b), the MSA is composed of eleven counties in Minnesota and two counties 
in Wisconsin (see Figure 3.1 below).  It is anchored by the two central cities of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, and has extensive suburban development in the seven 
Minnesota counties of Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, and Scott.  Since 2000, 
the area has experienced moderate population growth.  The 2000 Census estimated the 
population of the thirteen-county area at 2,968,806, making it the sixteenth largest MSA 
in the country.  By 2007 the American Community Survey placed the population at 
3,208,212, a growth rate of approximately 8.06 percent (U.S Census Bureau 2009a).  Of 
the seven primary counties in the metropolitan area, Table 3.1 below shows that 
Hennepin County was by far the most populous in 2000.  None of the primarily suburban 
counties exceeded 300,000 in population. 
 
Table 3.1:  Seven-County Metropolitan Area Population and Housing Data 
County Population, 2000 
Percent Population 
Growth, 2000-2007 
Percent Housing Units 
Owner-Occupied, 2000 
Anoka 298,084 9.45 83.38 
Carver 70,205 26.00 83.48 
Dakota 355,904 9.71 78.25 
Hennepin (including Minneapolis) 1,116,200 1.83 66.16 
Hennepin (minus Minneapolis) 733,582 7.07 74.34 
Ramsey (including St. Paul) 511,035 -2.18 63.47 
Ramsey (minus St. Paul) 223,884 4.35 74.34 
Scott 89,498 41.50 86.46 
Washington 201,130 12.60 85.68 
      (Sources:  U.S. Census Bureau 2009a, 2009b)
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Figure 3.1:  Twin Cities Metropolitan Statistical Area 
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 Taken as a whole, suburban Hennepin County is not representative of the seven 
counties mentioned above, though it is the most useful for drawing conclusions about 
affordable housing dynamics at the metropolitan scale.  Even with Minneapolis and St. 
Paul excluded from their respective counties, Table 3.1 above shows that Hennepin 
County had a lower than median percentage of owner-occupied housing units and 
population growth rate.  The differences result from the presence of many fully-
developed suburbs in Hennepin County, of which there are far fewer in the five counties 
lacking a central city.  Like all of the counties except Ramsey County though, Hennepin 
County also has many rapidly developing and semi-rural suburbs.  Thus, focusing on 
Hennepin County offers insight into the broadest possible range of suburban affordable 
housing dynamics, making it possible to generalize findings from it to the broader 
metropolitan area in a way focusing on no other county could. 
 However, caution is necessary when generalizing the results of a study of the 
Twin Cities MSA to other large MSAs.  Table 3.2 below shows medians of five 
demographic and housing values from the 2000 Census for the Twin Cities MSA and the 
other 24 largest MSAs in terms of population.  As the data demonstrate, the Twin Cities 
had less ethnic diversity, higher incomes, a higher proportion of owner-occupied housing 
units, and a higher median value of owner-occupied units in 2000.  While such values are 
a strong indication that its affordable housing dynamics do not represent those of many 
other large MSAs, the Twin Cities MSA is a valuable point of comparison for a subset of 
MSAs.  Demographically and in terms of tenure status, the Twin Cities MSA is broadly 
similar to other MSAs with populations under 3,000,000 in 2000.  Furthermore, its values 
are very similar to several MSAs with similar population sizes, including those of Denver, 
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Portland, and St. Louis.  Consequently, it is likely that the Twin Cities MSA will have 
many similarities to other MSAs with populations just above or below 3,000,000 that are 
expanding moderately. 
 
Table 3.2:  Medians of National Population and Housing Data, 2000 
 Twin Cities 
MSA 
25 largest 
MSAs 
Top 25 MSAs 
under 5,000,000 
Top 25 MSAs 
under 3,000,000 
Percent white alone 
 
86.15 73.01 79.11 80.77 
Median household 
income 
$54,304 $47,067 $45,502 $46,090 
Percent housing units 
owner-occupied 
72.44 65.19 66.76 67.95 
Median value of 
owner-occupied units 
$139,200 $132,600 $117,450 $115,300 
Median rent $641 $660 $651 $608 
(Source:  U.S. Census Bureau 2009b)  
 
 Another important factor to consider when comparing the Twin Cities to other 
metropolitan areas is the presence of a strong metropolitan government that is active in 
affordable housing development.  A comparable situation exists only in the Portland, 
Oregon metropolitan area.  The Minnesota state legislature passed a bill in 1967 to create 
the Metropolitan Council, a regional planning authority for Anoka, Carver, Dakota, 
Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington Counties.  In 1971 the Metropolitan Council 
formally committed itself to expanding the stock of affordable housing in suburban areas 
and in 1973 began administering federal housing programs in suburbs without their own 
housing authorities.  Also in the early 1970s, it gradually adopted a fair share housing 
program in which it set a goal of each city‘s ―fair share‖ of affordable housing units.  Its 
power expanded in 1976 when the legislature passed the Land Use Planning Act (LUPA), 
which required each city to submit a comprehensive plan to the Metropolitan Council, 
part of which had to be a housing plan detailing how the city would meet affordable 
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housing goals set by the Metropolitan Council.  Aggressive efforts by the Metropolitan 
Council to enforce fair share provisions resulted in significant expansions of affordable 
housing in suburban areas into the 1980s.  However, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development severely cut funding for subsidized housing under the Reagan 
Administration, and Minnesota state governors during the period were relatively 
unsupportive of the Metropolitan Council.  Consequently, the Metropolitan Council 
stopped enforcing fair share goals, resulting in a decline in affordable housing production 
in the Twin Cities suburbs.  In response to the shift, legislators passed the Livable 
Communities Act (LCA) in 1995, which reiterated the goals of LUPA and established 
three grant funds that provided cities money for affordable and life-cycle housing, 
pollution cleanup, and transportation-oriented development.  Joining LCA was voluntary, 
but cities could only access the grants if they joined it and agreed to affordable housing 
goals negotiated by the Metropolitan Council and the city (Goetz 2000; 2003). 
 The impact of the Metropolitan Council and LCA on the regional dynamics of 
affordable housing is mixed.  On one hand, the political pressure they apply makes it very 
difficult for a city to reject outright for an extended period the development of affordable 
housing within its boundaries.  As I will discuss in the presentation of results, this does 
not mean that affordable development occurs in every city.  However, it does mean that 
cities have less leeway to prevent affordable housing development than they may in a 
metropolitan area without a fair share housing program or metropolitan government.  On 
the other hand, it is possible that LCA has actually reduced the amount of affordable 
housing construction that would have occurred between 1996 and 2010, the years for 
which it is active, compared to what would have occurred had it not been in effect.  Goetz 
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(2000; 2003) notes that LCA provides the political cover for a city to stop allowing the 
development of affordable units once it meets its goal and to even demolish affordable 
units if it has surpassed its goal.  Furthermore, he points out that many cities were 
successful in negotiating with the Metropolitan Council to reduce the initial goals.  
Assuming that affordable housing production rates would have continued at the same 
pace they did in the early 1990s, Goetz argues that LCA has resulted in a net reduction in 
the number of units that will be produced between 1996 and 2010.  His argument 
recognizes that LCA has impacted the geography of affordable housing development, but 
maintains that the goals the Metropolitan Council set were not high enough. 
 In addition to the Metropolitan Council and LCA, there is a complex group of 
financing sources available from the federal government that help to stimulate and fund 
affordable housing development in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  One of the most 
common sources for rental housing is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, also known 
as Section 42 funding.  Funded by the federal government and administered in Minnesota 
through the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), a state agency tasked with 
providing funding for low- and moderate-income housing, it gives developers an income 
tax credit for a percentage of the cost of developing low-income rental units.  The 
developer then sells the tax credit to investors and uses the money from that sale to 
finance the development (MHFA 2009b).  Another common program is HUD‘s Section 8 
program.  Administered through local housing authorities, it allows qualifying low-
income residents to live in private, market-rate apartments.  They pay only 30 percent of 
their income and HUD pays the difference between that amount and the market rate.  
With tenant-based assistance, individuals receive a voucher and they can select any 
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housing unit that accepts Section 8 vouchers.  With project-based assistance, a housing 
unit receives a subsidy that varies depending on the income of the tenant (Goetz 2003). 
 A number of funding opportunities are also available from sources within 
Minnesota.  There is a wide variety of other grants and low-interest loans for developing, 
acquiring, or rehabilitating affordable rental housing, as well as several MHFA-sponsored 
loans to help households purchase a home that is made affordable by reducing or 
deferring loan interest (MHFA 2009a, 2009b).
1
  Individual cities are occasionally willing 
to provide funding of their own.  A common way is to establish a tax increment financing 
(TIF) district, which provides funding to a developer and then pays for that funding using 
the increment.  The increment is all property tax from the newly developed property 
above the amount it was yielding pre-development.  The amount of taxes the property 
yielded before development continues to go into the city‘s general fund.  Frequently cities 
require the developer benefitting from a TIF district to include some affordable units if 
the development includes any housing (Minnesota House of Representatives House 
Research 2008).  In the cities researched for this paper, developers typically drew 
simultaneously on many of the above funding sources to finance affordable housing. 
 Assessing the full impact of LCA and other funding sources is beyond the scope 
of this study, but it is clear that at the beginning of the study period, the distribution of 
existing affordable housing was very uneven.  Figure 3.2 on page 41 shows the percent 
affordable of total housing units in 2000 by city.
2
  The data breaks are quartiles.
3
  Distinct 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix One for a detailed table of specific state programs aimed at developing affordable housing. 
2
 As explained in the introduction, the definition of affordable is different for a rental unit versus an 
ownership unit.  Though Figure 3.2 shows the percent affordable of all units, it has applied each definition 
to its respective type of unit. 
3
 All following maps in this section will have quartile data breaks. 
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regions of affordability are apparent.  The cities in the top quartile of affordability are in a 
wedge extending north from Minneapolis, as well as the southern inner-ring suburb of 
Richfield and the distant western city of Maple Plain.  Several other inner-ring suburbs 
such as St. Louis Park, as well as Maple Grove and several western cities are also above 
the median percent affordable.  Less affordable cities include most of the developing 
suburbs such as Plymouth and Eden Prairie.  The least affordable places are primarily 
those cities that surround Lake Minnetonka in the west, as well as the upscale inner-ring 
suburb of Edina.   
 
The Research Design 
 I began this study by establishing the study area within Hennepin County, which 
Figure 3.3 below displays.  There are two major advantages to studying only Hennepin 
County.  First, as I explained above, it offers the most complete profile of suburban 
affordable housing dynamics short of studying all counties in the MSA, for which there 
were insufficient resources.  Second, it is possible that differences in county-level 
housing policies would introduce a variable into cross-county analyses of cities for which 
it would be difficult to control, a problem studying only one county eliminates.  Within 
Hennepin County, I then limited the study area to only those cities that had at least a 
portion of their land area within the Metropolitan Urban Service Area line because it is 
very difficult to build housing at the densities required to be affordable outside this line, 
which resulted in the exclusion of Hanover.  Next, in order to remove the variable of 
other counties‘ housing policies, I eliminated all cities not entirely within Hennepin 
County, which included Chanhassen, Dayton, Rockford, and (continued on page 43) 
41 
 
Figure 3.2:  Percent Affordable of All Units, 2000 
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Figure 3.3:  Study Area 
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St. Anthony.  Next, I excluded Minneapolis because it is the central city and experiences 
largely different housing dynamics than many suburban areas.  Finally, I excluded 
Hassan Township because of data availability constraints for townships.  Thirty-nine 
cities remain in the study area. 
I next compiled data detailing the geography of affordable housing production, 
affordable housing need, and municipal tax capacity in order to select case studies.  To 
represent production, I calculated the percentage affordable of total production, for each 
city in the period from 2000 to 2007 using data supplied by the Metropolitan Council 
(2009).  My study works to explain variation in the production variable.  The study 
period begins in 2000 because it is the earliest year for which data necessary to detail 
both the production and need of affordable housing are available.  I end with 2007 
because it is the last year for which data about production of affordable housing were 
available during the research stage of this thesis. 
Need is based on the housing requirements of both potential residents and current 
residents.  Because one of the central arguments in favor of expanding suburban supplies 
of affordable housing is amelioration of spatial mismatches, I used the Metropolitan 
Council‘s (2006) Job Proximity Ratio, the best available measure of spatial mismatch for 
low-income workers, to quantify demand for affordable housing for people not already 
living in the city.  The value is a ratio of low-wage jobs within 10 miles of a city‘s center 
point to low-income workers in the same area.  It is derived from the U.S. Census 
Bureau‘s Local Employment Dynamics data set for 2003.4   
                                                          
4
 Because the data are from 2003, it is not ideal for this research, but the U.S. Census Bureau does not 
publicly provide the data used in the Metropolitan Council’s calculations aggregated at a small enough 
scale for me to calculate the value for another year. 
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To quantify need for existing residents, I calculated a normalized measure of 
surplus or shortage for the existing low and moderate income population in each city 
which I have termed the ―supply index.‖  To do so, I first used the Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) database maintained by the HUD to calculate the 
number of rental units and the number of owner-occupied units that were affordable in 
each city in 2000.  Next, I again used the CHAS data to calculate the number of renting 
households earning below 50 percent of the AMI and the number of home-owning 
households earning below 80 percent of the AMI in each city.  I then subtracted the 
number of affordable units of each tenure type of housing from the number of households 
living in that tenure type needing affordable housing.
5
  I then divided that value by the 
number of households in that tenure type needing affordable housing of that tenure type.  
I finally calculated a mean of the rental and owner-occupied supply indices weighted by 
the number of households needing affordable housing in each tenure-type category and 
multiplied the value by 100. 
The resultant supply index value expresses the percentage of low- or moderate-
income residents for whom it would be impossible to find affordable housing in the city 
of the same tenure type in which they currently live.  A positive value indicates a 
shortage while a negative value indicates a surplus.  This measure does not take into 
account situations in which higher-income households instead of lower-income 
households occupy affordable units, but since such a situation is dependent on local 
market conditions, it is impossible to standardize for study across the county.  In contrast, 
the supply index is a standardized measure.  Finally, I developed a composite measure of 
                                                          
5
 There are frequently more households needing affordable units in a city than there are affordable units 
in that city, meaning many households are living in units unaffordable to them. 
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need, ranking cities based on the job proximity ratio mentioned above, with the city 
having the highest ratio being ranked with one, ranking the cities based on the supply 
index, with the city having the highest positive value being ranked number one, and then 
summing the two ranks.  Lower scores indicate higher need. 
I then calculated the tax capacity per capita for each city in 2000.  Tax capacity 
per capita is included because that value will indicate a city‘s relative ability to devote 
funds to affordable housing development, whether or not it chooses to do so.  To 
calculate the value, I collected data for city tax capacity in 2000 from the Minnesota 
Office of the State Auditor (2002a; 2002b), and then divided the value for each city by 
that city‘s population in 2000.  Tax capacity is calculated by multiplying the taxable 
value of each property by a factor determined by the type of land use of the property and 
then summing those values for the city.  Because the state does not cap the property tax 
rate a city can charge, it is an imperfect measure of the amount of revenue a city can 
generate through property taxes (Minnesota House of Representatives House Research 
2009).  Nevertheless, it is the only means of comparing the fiscal standing of cities. 
Next, I selected case studies by comparing the cities in terms of need, production, 
and tax capacity per capita.  I first determined the median percent affordable of all 
housing development from 2000 to 2007 in each city and labeled each city as higher than 
the median or lower than the median.  I then determined the median need score and 
labeled a city as having above or below median need.  Finally, I determined the median 
tax capacity per capita in 2000 and labeled each city as being above or below it.  Since 
there are 39 cities in the study area, one was the median value for each of the three 
measures.  I assigned the median city to the category in which the numerically closest 
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city fell.  I then assigned all cities to the appropriate cell of the matrix shown as Table 3.3 
below.  The geographic distribution of each category is shown in Figure 3.4 below. 
 
Table 3.3:  Affordable Housing Matrix 
 Higher Need Lower Need 
Higher Production / 
Higher Tax Capacity 
Eden Prairie 
Golden Valley 
Minnetonka 
Orono 
Plymouth 
Bloomington 
Higher Production / 
Lower Tax Capacity 
Hopkins 
New Hope 
Richfield 
St. Louis Park 
Brooklyn Center 
Brooklyn Park 
Champlin 
Loretto 
Maple Grove 
Osseo 
Robbinsdale 
Rogers 
St. Bonifacius 
Lower Production / 
Higher Tax Capacity 
Deephaven 
Edina 
Excelsior 
Greenwood 
Medicine Lake 
Minnetonka Beach 
Shorewood 
Tonka Bay 
Wayzata 
Woodland 
Independence 
Medina 
Minnetrista 
Lower Production / 
Lower Tax Capacity 
Spring Park Corcoran 
Crystal 
Greenfield 
Long Lake 
Maple Plain 
Mound 
 
Once the matrix was complete, I selected case studies based on population data.  
The areas with the largest populations and the most rapid growth are those where the 
absolute affordable housing stock can increase the most with improved public policies.  
Accordingly, within each matrix category, I ranked each city based on its total population 
in 2000, with the largest population receiving rank one, and separately on its population 
growth rate between 2000 and 2007, with the largest growth rate (continued on page 48)  
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Figure 3.4:  City Matrix Categories 
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receiving rank one.  The 2007 population figure is an estimate from the Minnesota State  
Demographic Center (2009).  I then summed the ranks and selected the city with the 
lowest sum for the case study.  All of the case study cities are shown in bold in Table 3.3. 
I next completed a systematic research process for each case study city.  
Comprehensive plans represent a city‘s primary statement of policy on development 
issues, including housing, so I first reviewed the two most recent comprehensive plans of 
each city.  Each of the eight cities had a comprehensive plan that took effect between 
1998 and 2000 and had drafted a new plan between 2008 and the present.  The earlier 
comprehensive plan gives an indication of policies in the earlier part of the study period, 
and the later one, though outside of the study period, reflects the trajectory of changes in 
attitudes and policy during the study period.  After evaluating the two most recent 
comprehensive plans, I searched databases of the Star Tribune, the major newspaper 
covering Minneapolis and Hennepin County suburbs, and local newspapers for each city 
about any articles related to affordable housing development between 2000 and 2007 in 
that city.  I reviewed minutes from city council and planning commission meetings in 
cases where an article provided insufficient information. 
Following document review, I visited each city to conduct interviews.
6
  In total I 
conducted fourteen interviews in June, July, and September of 2009 with city staff 
members, elected officials, individuals involved in non-profit organizations that provide 
affordable housing or advocate for its development, private individuals that have been 
heavily involved in affordable housing in their communities, and one person who had 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix Two for a sample of typical interview questions. 
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worked for a non-profit developer of affordable housing.
7
  I selected city staff members 
by calling relevant departments to speak to housing specialists.  I contacted elected 
officials and other respondents either by identifying them through newspaper articles or 
meeting minutes as being active in affordable housing debates, or by being referred 
through previous respondents.  For Mound, Minnetrista, and Spring Park I conducted 
only one interview each because all had relatively small populations and Mound and 
Minnetrista were low-need, low-production communities.  Consequently the affordable 
housing dynamic in each became very clear through one interview.  For Bloomington, I 
conducted three interviews because opportunities for additional interviews presented 
themselves.  All interview respondents provided informed consent on the condition that I 
maintain confidentiality.  Table 3.4 on the next page indicates a general profile of the 
respondents.  I have also drawn on three interviews from an earlier study of affordable 
housing in the Heart of the City development in Burnsville, a Dakota County suburb, and 
three interviews from a study of city-wide affordable housing development in Richfield, a 
Hennepin County suburb, in order to reinforce the findings from the case studies. 
After completing a full analysis of case study data, I conducted a brief statistical 
analysis of all of the cities in the study area to test some of the tentative conclusions that 
emerged from the case studies.  Using all of the non-ordinal variables from the case study 
selection process, as well as the percent affordable of the total housing stock, the percent 
growth in population between 2000 and 2007, the 2000 mean of the percent of the 
                                                          
7
 I interviewed this individual specifically in relation to his/her role in a particular city in a different 
capacity, but he/she also spoke to the broader role as a developer throughout the Twin Cities.  In this 
paper I will refer to these two roles as if they are two separate individuals in order to maintain 
confidentiality because linking the two could potentially disclose the respondent’s identity.  The 
developer will not appear in the table below providing general backgrounds of the interview respondents. 
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population in poverty in adjacent cities weighted by adjacent city population, the 2000 
mean of the percent of the population that was minority in adjacent cities weighted by 
adjacent city population, the 2000 median household income, the 2000 median value of 
owner-occupied units, and the 2000 median monthly rent of rental units, I determined a 
correlation coefficient for each variable with the percent affordable of all new housing 
development between 2000 and 2007.  The additional variables emerged as potential 
factors in literature and during the case study research process.  I then tested all 
independent variables that had a correlation coefficient that was significant at the .05 
level for covariance with each other.  I excluded from the final regression any variables 
with covariance significant at the .05 level except for the variable with the highest 
correlation coefficient with the dependent variable.  I then developed a linear regression 
model to explain the distribution of affordable housing development. 
 
Table 3.4:  Profile of Interview Respondents 
City Respondent Affiliation 
Plymouth Interview 1 – Elected official 
Interview 2 – City staff person 
St. Louis Park Interview 1 – City staff person 
Interview 2 – Non-profit staff person with 
Project for Pride in Living 
Edina Interview 1 – City staff person 
Interview 2 – Private citizen 
Spring Park Interview 1 – Elected official 
Bloomington Interview 1 – City staff person 
Interview 2 – Non-profit staff person with 
All Parks Alliance for Change 
Interview 3 – Non-profit member with All 
Parks Alliance for Change 
Maple Grove Interview 1 – Non-profit member with 
Housing for All 
Interview 2 – City staff person 
Minnetrista Interview 1 – Disclosure would identify 
individual 
Mound Interview 1 – Disclosure would identify 
individual 
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The research method I have used has a number of important strengths that make it 
the most appropriate way to approach the research questions at this stage.  While a 
detailed statistical approach would be useful to effectively develop new housing policies, 
the metropolitan dynamics of affordable housing development are not understood well 
enough to be able to select variables with relative certainty that no crucial variables have 
been overlooked.  My primarily qualitative approach takes the steps necessary to begin 
building the knowledge base to conduct a thorough statistical analysis.  Categorizing 
cities by how they relate to some basic descriptors of affordable housing development 
geography avoids major assumptions about the factors that are involved in creating that 
geography and provides a diverse cross-section of cities with different housing dynamics 
and housing policies.  By then using a very basic statistical analysis, I largely confirm my 
case study findings, suggesting that the study does a good job of explaining the dynamics 
of affordable housing development in Hennepin County suburbs. 
Nonetheless, there are several important caveats to note about the case study 
selection method.  First, the comparison of cities is a relative, not absolute, comparison.  
Labeling a city as being below the median in a particular measure does not mean that it 
does not need to develop more affordable housing units, that its production was 
extremely limited, or that its tax capacity is dangerously low.  The binary divisions of 
each measure contain a wide variety of cities.  Nevertheless, having eight categories in 
the matrix is meant to limit the within-group variation.  The general pattern of geographic 
grouping of cities within categories suggests that my methodology has done so.  Second, 
my measure of need for affordable housing is simple, and as a result, does not fully 
describe the geography of need.  Need also encompasses transportation connectivity, the 
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amount of land available for development, personal preferences of low- and moderate-
income households, and many other factors (Metropolitan Council 2006).  Incorporating 
all of those variables though would have been extremely difficult for a study of this scope.  
Moreover, since the focus of this paper is the economic consequences for low- and 
moderate-income households of not having an adequate suburban supply of affordable 
housing, a measure encompassing jobs is an adequate measure of need. 
 
Geography of Case Study Selection Variables 
 Production of affordable housing between 2000 and 2007 has several distinct 
patterns.  Figure 3.5 below shows the percent affordable of all housing units added 
between 2000 and 2007.  The areas of proportionately highest production are several 
inner-ring suburbs with already large stocks of affordable housing, as well as Maple 
Grove and several rural cities.  Also above the median are most of the other inner-ring 
suburbs and the developing suburbs.  It should be noted that the inner-ring suburbs have 
low absolute amounts of production because there is very little developable land in those 
areas.  Still, a large portion of the development that does occur is affordable.  Most of the 
more distant western suburbs are below the median.  Edina and Spring Park are the only 
suburbs with no affordable production during the study period.  Edina and most of the 
cities around Lake Minnetonka generally have very high median home prices and rents.  
The rural areas with low affordable housing production may have little demand for 
development in general, especially low- and moderate-income development. 
The geography of need conforms to a largely different pattern.  Figure 3.6 shows 
the first measure of need, the job proximity ratio.  Based on this (continued on page 55)  
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Figure 3.5:  Percent Affordable of All New Units, 2000-2007 
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Figure 3.6:  Job Proximity Ratio 
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measure the strongest need is in the western and southern inner-ring suburbs, Eden 
Prairie, and several of the cities around Lake Minnetonka.  Predictably, more distant 
areas have less need.  The inner-ring suburbs to the north of Minneapolis are also below 
the median.  It should still be noted however that the majority of cities have a ratio over 
one, indicating a lack of enough housing to accommodate low-income workers.  The 
other measure of need is the supply index, which Figure 3.7 shows.  Any area with a 
positive value has fewer affordable units than it does residents in need of those units.  
The suburbs bordering Lake Minnetonka, as well as Edina and Plymouth, have higher 
than median need based on the supply index.  Inner-ring suburbs and the northern 
suburbs without major lake amenities have lower than median need.  Figure 3.8 shows 
the composite need score.  Lower values indicate higher relative need for additional 
affordable units.  The areas in the highest quartile of need are several of the cities around 
Lake Minnetonka, as well as Edina, Eden Prairie, and Hopkins.  Except in the case of 
Hopkins, these are all suburbs with very high land values.  Most of the other inner-ring 
and developing suburbs to the west of Minneapolis have higher than median need.  Areas 
of lower relative need are the more distant exurban areas, the northern inner-ring suburbs, 
Mound, and Bloomington.  The distant areas have few jobs, and the nearer suburbs and 
Mound already have very large stocks of affordable housing. 
The data reveal a moderate mismatch between the geographies of production, 
need, and fiscal capacity to develop affordable housing.  While need is highest in Edina, 
Eden Prairie, and the suburbs at the eastern end Lake Minnetonka, only Eden Prairie had 
a percentage affordable of new development over the median.  Cities in the second 
quartile of need tended to experience production more (continued on page 58) 
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Figure 3.7:  Supply Index 
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Figure 3.8:  Composite Need Score 
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commensurate with need.  A notable outlier though is Maple Grove, which despite lower 
need had very high production, both in proportional and absolute terms.  Some of the 
closer suburbs such as Bloomington and Brooklyn Center with lower need had high 
production.  The mismatch between the geography of production and the fiscal capacity 
is more striking.  Figure 3.9 below shows the tax capacity per capita in each city in 2000.  
Cities with lower tax capacities per capita tended to have higher percent affordable 
production whereas cities with the higher tax capacities per capita had lower values. 
In the typology of cities that emerges from the above analysis, the majority of 
cities are grouped with similar cities and separated from different cities, suggesting that 
the typology is an effective categorizing tool.  The ―Higher Need, Lower Production, 
Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities all have the highest housing costs.  The ―Higher Need, 
Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities are primarily developing suburbs that 
have somewhat lower housing costs.  The ―Higher Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax 
Capacity‖ cities are all inner-ring suburbs.  The ―Lower Need, Lower Production, Lower 
Tax Capacity‖ cities have already large supplies of affordable housing and are mostly 
developed.  The ―Higher Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity‖ city of Spring 
Park, is very similar except that it is located closer to job centers.  The ―Lower Need, 
Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ city of Bloomington is fully developed yet has 
a large range of housing types and extensive commercial land use.  The ―Lower Need, 
Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities are largely rural and have generally 
affluent populations.  The only category with significant variation within is the ―Lower 
Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity‖ group, which includes inner-ring suburbs, 
developing areas, and semi-rural. 
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Figure 3.9:  Tax Capacity per Capita, 2000 
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Chapter Four:  Results 
 
Introduction 
 Through the results we begin to see a political economy of affordable housing 
development that is particular to each city, but one that across cities is chiefly, but not 
completely, motivated by a diverse set of economic concerns.  As this section will 
demonstrate, there is much consistency between cities, but we cannot even begin to fully 
account for the varying balance of economic constraints and resident opposition between 
cities with a linear model.  The process involves an intricate interaction of social, political, 
and economic forces, many of which are unique to each city.  In this chapter, I will detail 
these forces in each city while also relating them to the broader statistical analysis.  Each 
case study will address my research questions as they relate to the case study city.  The 
following chapter will synthesize and analyze all of the results.  The order in which I 
present case studies in this chapter is simply a linear progression through the matrix.  
Though I conducted the statistical analysis after the case studies, I present it first because 
it provides a useful macro-analysis against which to compare case studies.  Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 present data that are useful to situating each case study in the broader study area. 
 
Table 4.1:  Thirty-Nine City Study Area Comparison Values 
Variable Value in Study Area 
Population in 1990 651,621 
Population in 2000 719,851 
Population estimate in 2007 755,122 
Percent growth in population, 1990-2000 10.47 
Percent growth in population, 2000-2007 4.91 
Median household income, 2000 $54,304
8
 
Percent households in poverty, 2000 3.84 
    (Sources:  Minnesota State Demographic Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b) 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 For the MSA as a whole; no sufficiently precise data is publicly available for only the study area. 
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Table 4.2:  Case Study Selection Values 
 Percent affordable 
of housing units 
added, 2000-2007 
Job proximity 
ratio 
Supply index Need score Tax capacity per 
capita, 2000 
Study Area 
Median 
2.38 1.60 -3.88 40 $1,015.57 
Plymouth 14.37 1.59 -3.60 40 $1,276.10 
St. Louis Park 6.64 1.86 -13.33 31 $1,015.57 
Edina  0.00 1.93 44.75 5 $1,627.12 
Spring Park 0.00 1.71 56.19 16 $905.56 
Bloomington 37.30 1.46 -18.97 51 $1,270.88 
Maple Grove 30.16 1.14 -180.72 68 $878.43 
Minnetrista 1.37 1.09 16.88 45 $1,589.69 
Mound 1.43 1.13 -59.23 66 $834.47 
      (Sources:  HUD 2009; Metropolitan Council 2006; Minnesota Office of the State Auditor 2002a, 2002b) 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 The statistical analysis suggests that across the study area economic constraints 
played a far greater role in shaping the geography of affordable housing development 
than did resident opposition.  Table 4.3 below shows the correlation coefficients for 
independent variables with the percent affordable of new housing units.  The supply 
index and tax capacity per capita in 2000 co-vary strongly with the total percent 
affordable in 2000,
9
 so they are not included in the regression analysis, the results of 
which Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 below show.  Most importantly, neither the mean adjacent 
poverty nor the mean adjacent minority variables, both of which would capture intent to 
exclude, are significant.  The median household income, median owner-occupied unit 
value, and median rent value would also indicate intent of wealthier or more expensive 
cities to exclude, but none are significant.  Finally, a negative correlation with the percent 
growth variable would indicate that developed communities were hesitant to change their 
existing housing composition, but the relationship is positive and not significant.  While 
                                                          
9
 See Appendix Three for a complete correlation matrix. 
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the significance of total percent affordable in 2000 could indicate an impact of resident 
opposition, the insignificance of variables meant to capture opposition suggests that 
economic constraints are more to blame.  The significance of the jobs proximity ratio 
probably indicates that a greater commercial presence attracts higher-value housing.  
Nonetheless, the weakness of the regression analysis demonstrates the complexity of the 
forces influencing the geography of affordable housing development.  The following case 
studies highlight many of the factors for which the statistical analysis cannot account. 
 
Table 4.3:  Correlation Matrix 
 Job proximity 
ratio 
Supply index Tax capacity 
per capita, 
2000 
Total percent 
affordable, 
2000 
Percent 
population 
growth, 2000-
2007 
Percent 
affordable of 
new housing 
units 
-.376* -.349* -.367* .413** .248 
 
 Mean adjacent 
poverty 
Mean adjacent 
minority 
Median 
household 
income, 2000 
Median owner-
occupied unit 
value, 2000 
Median rent, 
2000 
Percent 
affordable of 
new housing 
units 
-.139 -.168 -.294 -.402 -.227 
* - significant at the 0.05 level 
** - significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table 4.4:  Regression Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Standard Error of the Estimate 
.509 .259 .218 13.28097 
 
Table 4.5:  Regression ANOVA Summary 
Model Sum of Squares Degrees of Freedom Mean Square F Significance 
Regression 2,223.142 2 1,111.571 6.302 .005 
Residual 6,349.828 36 176.384   
 
Table 4.6:  Regression Coefficients 
 Coefficient t Significance 
Constant 19.75 1.794 .081 
Total percent affordable, 2000 .229 2.397 .022 
Jobs proximity ratio -12.75 -2.079 .045 
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Plymouth – Higher Need, Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity 
 Located approximately 12 miles northwest of downtown Minneapolis, Plymouth 
is an affluent, developing suburb.  It has experienced heavy residential development since 
1970, as well as large-scale commercial development in more recent years.  The decade 
of 1970 saw the most rapid relative increase in population, with a 74.9 percent increase 
between 1970 and 1980.  Growth began to slow in the 1980s, although it remained higher 
than the study area as a whole in both the period of 1990 to 2000, during which the 
growth rate was 29.5 percent, and 2000 to 2007, during which the growth rate was 8.0 
percent (City of Plymouth 2000; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).  Only the northwestern 
quadrant of the city remains undeveloped, but it is expected to support the development 
of up to 5,775 more housing units before 2030.  With only 54 percent of the housing 
stock being single-family detached and 46 percent being attached, it has a balanced 
housing stock.  However, owner-occupied housing dominates, composing 71 percent of 
housing units (City of Plymouth 2009).  The median value of an owner-occupied unit in 
2000 was $197,600
10
 and the median rent of a rental unit was $895.  Median household 
income in 2000 was a high $77,008 and the household poverty rate was a low 2.46 
percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). 
Both Plymouth‘s official documents and its actions suggest a stronger than 
average commitment to increasing the city‘s supply of affordable housing.  The 2000 
Comprehensive Plan explains in unusual detail both the challenges to developing 
affordable housing in Plymouth and the reasons the city needs more.  For example, it 
explains, ―Given the cost of housing in the City and the make-up of the City‘s job market, 
                                                          
10
 All dollar values quoted in this section are in terms of the year being referenced. 
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high housing costs are likely an obstacle to non-residents who work in Plymouth‖ (City 
of Plymouth 2000, p. 5.9).  Its 2009 draft plan reiterates the conclusions in the 2000 plan 
and includes as one of its three primary housing goals, ―Promote the development and 
preservation of a supply of quality housing that is affordable at all income levels and at 
all stages of life‖ (City of Plymouth 2009, p. 4.1).  As a point of departure, it still accepts 
new Metropolitan Council goals as worthy to attempt to achieve, but qualifies its 
intention by stating, ―Nevertheless, the City‘s affordable housing goal will be difficult to 
meet due to several factors including high land prices, inflationary pressure on building 
materials, transportation infrastructure in undeveloped areas of the city and limited 
availability of land for commercial purposes‖ (City of Plymouth 2009, p. 4.7-4.8).  It is 
uncertain and impossible to ascertain whether this means the city has no intention of 
meeting the goal or will try but does not expect to meet it because the only people who 
know, government officials, would not have revealed that information to me. 
Plymouth‘s actions between 2000 and 2007 indicate that the city will make its 
best effort to achieve the goal, and has no intent to exclude affordable housing.  In 2001, 
its Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA), which manages the Section 8 program 
in Plymouth, actively sought additional Section 8 vouchers to fill a need for additional 
affordable rental units (―HRA offers Section 8 rental assistance‖ 2001).  Furthermore, the 
elected official I interviewed explained that in the development approval process, the city 
usually discusses the possibility of including affordable housing.  The city staff member 
corroborated this point by saying, ―When a developer comes in and they start talking with 
the Planning Department about developing some certain site or parcel, I often get brought 
into second or third conversations with them just to talk about affordability, because you 
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want to make sure the developers know that it is a priority of the city.‖  While there is no 
reason to doubt that the city actually pressured developers to include affordable units, 
there was no evidence from the study period that the city successfully convinced a 
developer that originally had no intention of including affordable units to include them in 
its final plans.  That point notwithstanding, the city has directly contributed funding to 
projects.  For Lancaster Village, a 160-unit apartment building with 16 affordable units, 
the city provided $2.9 million in financing through city bonds (Thompson 2001).  For 
both Vicksburg Commons, a mixed-income senior rental development with affordable 
units, and Stone Creek Village, a 130-unit apartment building with 34 affordable units, 
the city established TIF districts (Thompson 2001; 2006). 
The seemingly successful efforts to develop affordable housing belie the serious 
economic obstacles that inhibit affordable housing development in Plymouth.  The 
elected official with whom I spoke explained that as a result of high land values in 
Plymouth, ―Really, by and large, our biggest hang up getting it [affordable housing 
development] done in Plymouth is funding.‖  The city staff member agreed and added 
that the land available in northwest Plymouth will be very expensive to develop because 
it has many wetlands and forests.  Of the affordable housing development that does occur 
in the city, the staff member explained, ―We certainly don‘t see too much single-family 
detached projects coming through with an affordability component, and it‘s simply 
because of the cost of land issue.‖  Even among those, the staff member believed that 
none could have been completed without government subsidies or other non-market 
sources.  Undoubtedly Plymouth has a strong fiscal standing and could devote additional 
resources to overcome economic obstacles if it chose to do so, but the elected official 
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expressed the sentiment that raising taxes would be unacceptable to constituents.  
Accordingly political will to develop affordable housing is strong compared with other 
cities, but it is unlikely that the city will expand its efforts. 
Resident opposition has little impact on the unlikelihood that the city will promote 
affordable housing development more aggressively.  Both respondents noted that 
neighborhood opposition to affordable developments had occurred in the study period, 
but neither felt that the affordability component was the reason people opposed the 
project.  The city staff member aptly explained the situation: 
The residents – in general, I would say – they come out when a 
development, whether it‘s got affordability in it or not, has some impact 
on them or there‘s some kind of change going on in an area that they feel 
would impact them, in an adjacent site or something.  And it‘s pretty much 
a mix of the folks that are for it and the folks that are against it.  You never 
know what‘s going to happen with each development, what they‘re going 
to say and the reasons they don‘t think it should be developed or the 
reasons they‘re going to say it should be developed.  I think a lot of people 
just don‘t like to see the open space that they might have enjoyed but 
never owned go away. 
 
The staff member later explained, ―We‘ve had developments occur where people have 
argued that their property values will decline if affordable housing is built near them,‖ 
but later explained that in the one case in mind, the city approved the project anyway.  
However, the elected official noted, ―Over the years I have just seen less and less and less 
resistance.‖  Even if people do oppose affordable housing developments, the elected 
official added, ―I think that there may have been some people that maybe kind of thought, 
maybe choosing the words, ‗I don‘t want those people in my backyard,‘ but I really think 
that it takes a lot of courage anymore to use those words.‖  It thus makes it difficult to 
determine the cause of the only instance of major opposition, which was to Stone Creek 
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Village, which many surrounding residents opposed on environmental and traffic-related 
grounds (Thompson 2002).  Whatever the cause though, the dynamics of opposition in 
Plymouth indicate that the majority of residents would accept increased affordable 
housing development if it did not offend their aesthetic sensibilities. 
 The presence of moderate political support for existing efforts supports such a 
hypothesis.  Though residents have rarely come to City Council and Planning 
Commission meetings in large numbers to express support for developments because 
they include affordable units, both respondents recognized that a small number of people 
often do.  Furthermore, several faith-based organizations, including Metropolitan 
Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing and Interfaith Outreach are active in Plymouth, 
both in advocating for approval of specific developments and in lobbying for changes to 
city policy that are favorable to affordable development (Hanks and Nichols 2001).  A 
survey of residents found that a small majority favored development of more affordable 
housing, despite most of the respondents not needing affordable housing for themselves 
(Thompson 2004).  Resident support does not necessarily translate into affordable 
housing development, but many developers appear willing to add affordable units, as the 
staff member explained in saying, ―I think for the most part, the main developers here in 
this metro area and the ones that focus here on Plymouth are very open to looking at 
putting in a wide variety of product options in their subdivisions.‖ 
 
St. Louis Park – Higher Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity 
 In contrast to Plymouth, St. Louis Park is a fully-developed, inner-ring suburb 
with a large existing supply of affordable housing.  There was a boom in housing 
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construction in the late 1930s, and again from the end of World War II until 1960.  Until 
1960, nearly all of the housing construction was of single-family homes, but following 
1960, nearly all construction was of multi-family housing, leading to the current balance 
of 55 percent single-family housing and 45 percent multi-family.  By 1980, nearly all of 
the land in the city had been developed, and given that much of the housing stock is 
relatively old, the city has begun to focus heavily on redevelopment (City of St. Louis 
Park 1999).  By 2007, the population had reached 44,126, and it is expected to grow 
slowly if the city succeeds in spurring redevelopment (Minnesota State Demographic 
Center 2009).  That population had a relatively low median household income of $49,260 
in 2000 and a household poverty rate of 5.06 percent.  The fact that nearly 56 percent of 
the housing stock was affordable in 2000 reflects the lower than average socioeconomic 
status of many of the city‘s residents (HUD 2009).  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that St. Louis Park had the highest tax capacity per capita of the cities in its category and 
does not face issues of decline to the same extent as those cities. 
 City policy during the study period favored higher-end housing over affordable 
housing, though the city still supported affordable housing development and preservation.  
For example, in response to the old, generally small-sized, and comparatively low-
amenity housing in St. Louis Park, the Comprehensive Plan 2000-2020 explains, ―The 
creation of move-up housing [larger, more expensive housing for households ready to 
move out of starter homes], either through rehabilitation of existing homes, 
redevelopment of blighted properties or brownfields, or development of existing vacant 
lots is one of the City‘s highest priorities for its housing policies and programs‖ (City of 
St. Louis Park 1999, p. D-9).  The plan recognizes (p. D-16) ―there is still an insufficient 
69 
 
number of units available within reach of lower income families, especially larger 
families,‖ and adopts Metropolitan Council affordable housing goals, though it never 
suggests that affordable housing is a top priority comparable to move-up housing.  The 
Comprehensive Plan 2010-2030 – May 2009 Draft (p. D-22) repeats the same goals, and 
adds in even stronger language:  ―At the present time, the greatest deficit and need is for 
the creation and maintenance of detached, owner-occupied single family housing [units] 
which are large enough to accommodate families.  City housing efforts and resources 
should primarily address this need,‖ indicating that move-up housing became an even 
higher priority during the study period (City of St. Louis Park 2009). 
 Written policies seem to suggest that the city does not consider affordable housing 
development a priority, but actions show that the city contributed considerable efforts and 
resources to the issue during the study period.  The city is highly unusual in that it has its 
own public housing authority that manages 268 units of Section 8 housing and 159 units 
of public housing.  During the study period, the Section 8 program expanded by 18 units 
and the public housing program expanded by 12 units (City of St. Louis Park 2008).  The 
city also provided funding to numerous non-profit providers of affordable housing.  Most 
notably, it provided $140,000 of its Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in 
the form of a grant to Project for Pride in Living (PPL), a non-profit organization based 
in Minneapolis, to assume ownership of 11 of the 15 buildings in Louisiana Court, a 
dilapidated apartment complex, rehabilitate them, and assure their affordability for 30 
years.  In 2006 the city provided a $400,000 loan financed through bonds to PPL as well 
as assistance in seeking $4 million in additional funds to undergo improvements and 
refinancing (Kelsh 2006).  Finally, the city has used TIF districts to assist affordable 
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developments.  For example, in 2004 it established a TIF district for Aquila Commons, a 
senior cooperative with affordable units (Kelsh 2004). 
The dynamics of redevelopment present the biggest obstacle to developing 
affordable housing in St. Louis Park.  Most importantly, the extremely short supply of 
vacant land typically precludes large-scale development of any kind, meaning the 
absolute number of new affordable units was small.  Excelsior and Grand, a 344-unit 
mixed-use development with 18 Section 8 units, is the only example during the study 
period, and it required a challenging acquisition of parcels through eminent domain, 
according to the city staff person I interviewed.  Furthermore, the staff person noted that 
for a new development to be affordable in St. Louis Park, subsidies are necessary.  In the 
case of Excelsior and Grand and other smaller redevelopment projects, the high costs of 
redevelopment made seeking funding with affordable housing requirements necessary, 
but when developers did not directly seek subsidies, the city did not tend to require them 
to include affordable units because the city prefers higher-value move-up housing over 
affordable housing.  A large portion of development is thus affordable not because the 
city promotes affordable development, but rather because many redevelopments must 
draw on subsidies that require inclusion of affordable units. 
 Nonetheless, the political climate is relatively supportive of affordable housing, 
which made the development of a large proportion of affordable housing and the 
preservation of existing units possible.  The respondent from PPL explained: 
I do think the city of St. Louis Park is mindful of the fact that as an older 
suburb, there is a portion of the population there – not folks that moved 
out from Minneapolis to try and take over the community or whatever 
people imagine happens in those situations, but people who live in St. 
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Louis Park – who are genuinely poor and need the support of the 
community in order to live safe lives. 
  
The respondent had worked in a number of inner-ring suburbs of Minneapolis, and felt 
that St. Louis Park had been more consistently committed to affordable housing 
development than had others.  Louisiana Court is indicative of a very limited opposition 
to affordable housing in St. Louis Park.  The city staff person explained, ―There was not 
resident push-back on that at all because the properties were in pretty tough shape to 
begin with, so it was kind of like, if someone can come in and help this out, yeah, we 
want that to happen.‖  The respondent from PPL said that the organization chose the site 
for exactly that reason, noting, ―When we can step into a place where, somewhat like St. 
Louis Park, we can step into a situation that is being badly mismanaged and say we can 
do better than that, we‘re a lot more likely to get neighborhood support.‖  Indeed, as the 
following statement by the same respondent indicates, there was cautious support: 
So, in general, there was pretty good support.  I think that there was also 
kind of alongside that a real anxiety among some folks, not so much about 
introducing low-income or affordable housing, so much as being afraid 
that there would be a big change and that there would be a lot more poor 
people and that there would be a lot more trouble. 
 
Nevertheless, the concern was not great enough to derail city plans to contribute 
significant financing to the project on two occasions and demonstrates powerfully that 
there is no government intent to exclude affordable housing from St. Louis Park. 
 Resident support is contingent though on the project not drastically changing the 
character of a neighborhood.  The city staff person explained, ―If we were to come in and 
do a wholesale redevelopment of the site [a proposed redevelopment site], and put in 
concentration of affordable housing, there would be issues.‖  Regardless of the 
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concentration of affordable housing, density is a major concern for residents.  Aquila 
Commons generated some opposition because of its high density, but the developer 
removed from the plan 8 of the originally proposed 122 units and changed the location of 
the buildings on the property, after which he received approval.  As the city staff person 
explained ―Some of the immediate neighbors had more concerns about development, 
period.  The affordability wasn‘t really an issue.‖  The fact that small changes quieted 
opposition reinforces the staff person‘s point.  Consequently, while affordable 
development can occur, it must not represent a drastic departure from the land use in the 
surrounding neighborhoods.  Maintaining continuity with the surrounding neighborhoods 
may have limited the number of affordable units that were developed, but it did not 
prevent affordable housing projects from proceeding. 
 
Edina – Higher Need, Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity 
 An inner-ring suburb immediately west of southwest Minneapolis, Edina is one of 
the most affluent cities in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  It began developing in the 
late-1800s and reached full development by 1970.  There is now very little land for new 
development, so the city is turning to infill redevelopment of land (City of Edina 2008).  
As of 2000, 63 percent of housing units were single-family, and of the total housing stock, 
73 percent were owner-occupied.  The median value of an owner-occupied unit in 2000 
was $248,500, and had risen rapidly to $435,000 by 2005 (City of Edina 2008; U.S. 
Census Bureau 2009b).  The median rent in 2000 was $864.  Median household income 
in 2000 was $66,019, and the household poverty rate was 3.33 percent (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2009b).  Relative to the other case study cities, it is an extreme case in that it has 
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both a very high need for more affordable housing and ample resources to devote to its 
development, but it developed no affordable units during the study period. 
 City policy in regards to affordable housing development is extremely weak 
compared with most other case study cities.  The 1998 Comprehensive Plan (p. 2.11) 
places as its only objective related to residential land use, ―Protect and maintain the 
quality of single dwelling neighborhoods while providing for life cycle housing choice 
for all residents.‖  The plan‘s language clarifies its priorities.  It uses powerful operative 
words such as ―allow,‖ ―provide,‖ and ―restrict‖ related to maintaining the character of 
single-family neighborhoods, but it uses much more ambiguous and non-committal 
language related to affordable development, such as the stated objective, ―Seek 
opportunities to increase the supply of affordable housing as detailed in the Housing 
Element‖ (p. 2.11).  Edina 20/20, a vision statement created in 2000 and revised in 2003 
with the intention of guiding the 2008 comprehensive plan update, offers only one 
objective related to housing, which reads, ―Maintain strong residential neighborhoods,‖ 
and never mentions affordability (City of Edina 2003, p. 3).  The Edina Comprehensive 
Plan Update 2008 acknowledges in detail that the lack of affordable housing in Edina is 
putting pressure on lower-income residents and is preventing many other people, such as 
the children of older Edina residents, from moving into the city.  However, it only adopts 
the Metropolitan Council goal of adding 212 affordable units between 2011 and 2020 and 
offers no means of achieving the goal.  Because there was no affordable development 
during the study period, it is impossible to know what kinds of subsidies the city would 
have considered extending for affordable developments. 
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 Undoubtedly some of Edina‘s reticence to develop robust policies to encourage 
affordable housing development is rooted in the major economic obstacles to building 
affordable units.  A city staff person explained, ―The expense of land is really making it 
difficult for developers.‖  Significant subsidies would therefore be necessary for 
widespread affordable housing development.  A panel discussion among developers 
hosted by the city during the most recent comprehensive plan draft process revealed that 
developers believe Edina is less willing to provide subsidies than other cities (City of 
Edina 2007a).  When asked why this was the case, the city staff member responded, ―I 
think they haven‘t had to [offer subsidies] in the past because the market has taken care 
of it.  The city hasn‘t had the need to get involved.‖  Given that interest in development is 
high even without incentives to developers, the city has little short-term justification for 
spending public money on affordable housing subsidies.  Speaking in regards to the 
economic constraints though, the citizen suggested, ―It‘s a real obstacle, but other 
communities have had high land values and figured out ways to do it [affordable housing] 
also.  Plymouth, Minnetonka, Maple Grove, Woodbury – they‘re all upscale communities.  
You have to assume that land is fairly pricey there also, and they figured out a way to do 
it.  I think if Edina had the political will, they could figure out how to do it also.‖  The 
city can therefore block affordable housing development by doing little to promote it. 
The lack of political will goes beyond a simple absence of economic incentives to 
also account for intense resident opposition to the higher density housing necessary to 
produce affordable units in Edina.  In 2004, the Edina City Council established the 
Housing Task Force, a panel of private citizens and city staff people to study the issue of 
affordable housing in Edina and produce recommendations that would be considered for 
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the 2008 comprehensive plan update.  In October of 2006, the panel released the Housing 
Succession Plan, which concluded that Edina had a serious shortage of affordable 
housing.  Most importantly, it established the goal of making 500 new units of affordable 
housing by 2020, 212 of which would be targeted at households earning 60 percent of the 
AMI, 175 at households earning 80 percent of the AMI, and 113 for families earning up 
to 115 percent of the AMI.  To achieve these goals, it called for the common measures of 
increased density in some areas, mixed use redevelopment, and other creative financing 
mechanisms.  In addition though, it made the radical proposal for an inclusionary zoning 
ordinance (Housing Task Force 2006).  Inclusionary zoning, not in place anywhere in 
Minnesota, requires that developers make a certain percentage of units in every new 
development affordable or pay a penalty.  Often developers can build at slightly higher 
densities to offset the added costs of making a unit affordable.  While the Housing 
Succession Plan was incorporated into initial drafts of Edina Comprehensive Plan 
Update 2008, the City Council ultimately voted in the face of intense public opposition to 
remove all of the policy provisions except for the goal of 212 affordable units for 
households at 60 percent of the AMI, because the Metropolitan Council required the 
adoption of that goal (Smetanka 2008). 
 The public opposition was wide in scope and focused on several issues.  The 
private citizen with whom I spoke was a member of the Housing Task Force.  The 
individual explained that affordability was not the biggest point of opposition, but rather, 
―The more serious issue is density.  There‘s a strong aversion to high and medium density 
housing.  I think there‘s a fair number of people that support affordable housing 
initiatives.‖  Indeed, in four public comment sessions meant to discuss the housing plan, 
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people in each one mentioned a need for more affordable housing while others opposed 
higher density.  In some cases one person took both positions (City of Edina 2007b-f).  
While such opposition might have been genuine, the citizen believed it might have also 
masked an anti-affordable housing bias.  The citizen explained: 
They don‘t want to admit that they‘re classist.  They don‘t want to admit 
that they‘re carrying out some prejudices.  That would be perceived as 
racism, so instead you get traffic.  You get density.  You get 
environmental issues, and they‘ll throw those out, and that‘s not to say that 
those aren‘t legitimate issues, because they can be legitimate issues, but I 
think they come up more when people are talking about affordable 
housing, or mental housing, or high-density housing, than it does with 
housing types that they perceive to be more desirable. 
 
Furthermore, both the citizen and the city staff person noted that there is a widespread 
negative attitude towards rental housing in the city.  The citizen even explained, ―Some 
of the people on our Housing Task Force were having difficulty accepting rental housing.  
They wanted to see us provide all of our affordable housing initiatives through something 
that was owner-occupied.‖  That the city responded to public opposition by weakening 
proposed affordable housing policies does not necessarily indicate intent to exclude 
affordable housing, but does demonstrate intent to exclude the densities of housing 
necessary to achieve large amounts of affordable housing development in Edina. 
 
Spring Park – Higher Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity 
 At only 210 acres in area, Spring Park is a tiny city uniquely dominated by rental 
housing.  It began in the 1880s as a Lake Minnetonka resort town, and grew slowly until 
after World War II.  Then, between 1950 and 1990, its population grew from about 200 
to more than 1,500 (City of Spring Park 2008).  Population continues to grow slowly, 
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with a population of 1,717 in 2000 and 1,926 in 2007 (Minnesota State Demographic 
Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).  However, the city has been fully developed 
since the 1980s, so population increase is a result of redevelopment to higher density land 
use.  In fact, Spring Park has, on average, the highest housing density of any case study 
city.  As of 2006, 68.1 percent of the housing units were in buildings with more than 20 
total units.  Of the total housing stock, 73.3 percent was renter occupied in 2000 (City of 
Spring Park 2008).  While in 2000 the median household income was a low $36,071, the 
median home value was $194,200, and the median rent was $724, the city began 
attracting a wealthier population during the study period as it saw property values rise at 
unprecedented rates due to its location on Lake Minnetonka.  By 2006, the median home 
value had risen to $458,990 (City of Spring Park 2008).  Although much of its housing 
stock remains affordable, the quantitative data suggest that it is struggling to fulfill the 
needs of even its existing residents, and it is close to job concentrations in suburbs not far 
to the east, hence it is in the higher need category. 
 Spring Park is the case study city with the least well-developed affordable 
housing policies.  Its 1998 amendment to the 1991 comprehensive plan makes only one 
mention of affordable housing, noting that the wide variety of housing types means that 
there are many affordable options in the city.  The main thrust of the stated policy was to 
maintain the housing stock and tax base (City of Spring Park 1998).  Objectives such as, 
―Reinforce and improve community identity,‖ and, ―Maintain and protect the tax base for 
the city,‖ are emblematic of the plan (City of Spring Park 1998, p. 20).  The plan does not 
indicate that the city was negligent, but rather that because the city‘s housing stock was 
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relatively affordable at the time and it was meeting all Metropolitan Council goals, there 
was no need for more detailed policies. 
The new comprehensive plan begins to emphasize redevelopment, and for the first 
time has an affordable housing section.  Interestingly though, the affordable housing 
component notes, ―The City believes that with 40 percent of its housing already 
affordable that it already has the capacity to accommodate 31 additional households 
within its current housing stock‖ (City of Spring Park 2008, p. 126).  The plan goes on to 
explain that the city believes more Section 8 vouchers will come to it and that job growth 
in the city will be less than Metropolitan Council projections (City of Spring Park 2008).  
Spring Park thus accepts the Metropolitan Council‘s housing goal of 31 additional 
affordable units between 2011 and 2020, but refuses to establish policies to achieve the 
goal, believing it can already accommodate additional low- and moderate-income 
households.  According to an elected official, the Metropolitan Council required revisions 
to the first draft of the housing portion, but accepted the second draft, which only added 
more detail for why the city felt a 31-unit goal was excessive. 
Such an approach does not, however, represent growing hostility to affordable 
housing, but rather is indicative of recognition of the significant economic obstacles to 
developing affordable housing in Spring Park that the city must now confront because of 
pressure from the Metropolitan Council that it did not experience in 1998.  Given that no 
affordable units were developed in Spring Park during the study period, an elected 
official explained, ―The cost of the land is probably the biggest obstacle.  The second 
obstacle is probably the size of our parcels is small, so to assemble enough parcels to 
have a high enough density to be able to create a significant number of units, it‘s tough.‖  
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The only two major developments that occurred during the study period demonstrate the 
official‘s point to some extent.  Both Lakeview Lofts, a 39-unit condominium building, 
and The Mist, a 120-unit condominium building, were completed in 2005 as very high-
value developments with no affordable units.  The elected official noted, ―There was no 
way that the developer could make one of those condominium units, any of them, 
affordable without some sort of subsidy.  It just never even entered into the equation 
because the cost of the land is just so high.‖ 
Of course, the city could have chosen to subsidize the developments, and in fact 
the city created a TIF district for Lakeview Lofts to finance pollution cleanup, but did not 
offer funding for affordable housing.  One explanation offered in the comprehensive plan 
is that increasing land values threaten to force existing residents out by driving up their 
property taxes.  High-value developments such as Lakeview Lofts and The Mist provide 
enough taxes to the city that it can afford to not raise taxes as quickly, enabling existing 
residents to stay in their homes (City of Spring Park 2008).  Another explanation, though, 
is that city residents are opposed to seeing city resources go to subsidize development.  
The elected official explained, ―I think that in general any city money going toward any 
development project, I don‘t think that would be taken very strongly here.‖  The official 
is probably correct because the comprehensive plan explicitly states that residents value 
fiscal conservatism, and in a public hearing before the Planning Commission related to 
Lakeview Lofts, one resident voiced opposition to the use of city money for pollution 
cleanup (City of Spring Park 2004c; City of Spring Park 2008). 
Opposition for non-economic reasons also occurred, but there is little evidence 
that affordable housing would generate significantly more intense opposition.  In 
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reference to the two condo developments, the elected official explained, ―Those really 
divided the city into those that wanted to keep what was there remaining, and those that 
wanted to clean up the area.‖  The official added, ―Because we are a fully developed city, 
having any kind of change like that is tough for residents that are long-term residents.  
It‘s hard for them to see past what‘s already there and to envision something that might 
be different, but better.‖  The issue was not just resistance to change.  Rather, the official 
explained, ―I think it was just that people didn‘t want that scale of development.  Both of 
those developments required a significant amount of variances, conditional use approvals 
that I think the residents just thought was too much.‖  At a Planning Commission meeting 
in which the Planning Commission ultimately recommended the approval of Lakeview 
Lofts, ten residents spoke about the project.  Five were against it because of the height, 
four simply had questions, and only one voiced support for the project (City of Spring 
Park 2004c).  There are no records of contentious public hearings about The Mist, though 
the elected official feels that project was divisive as well.   Despite resident opposition 
and concern by the City Council about issues such as density, parking, and aesthetics, the 
City Council approved Lakeview Lofts unanimously in September 2004 and The Mist 
unanimously in November 2004 (City of Spring Park 2004a; 2004b).  Furthermore, in 
early 2005, the developer of The Mist requested an amendment of the plan to increase the 
project from 112 to 120 units, which the City Council approved unanimously despite 
frustration with the request (City of Spring Park 2005). 
Two points about the outcome of Lakeview Lofts and The Mist are important.  
First, they generated opposition for the same reasons many affordable housing 
developments generate opposition:  they were major projects and were somewhat 
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different from the surrounding area, which has slightly shorter buildings.  They were 
high-value developments though, which suggests that the extra opposition affordable 
housing might generate when it is a well-designed project is small.  Second, and more 
importantly, the City Council approved the projects despite the significant opposition and 
only lukewarm support.  Barring corruption, which there is no reason to believe existed in 
these instances, the only explanation for the council‘s action is that is that it was 
responding to the fiscal incentives to allow high-value housing development. 
 
Bloomington – Lower Need, Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity 
 Like St. Louis Park and Edina, Bloomington is a developed, inner-ring suburb, 
although, owing to a somewhat different course of development, it has more 
opportunities to promote affordable housing development.  As with both Edina and St. 
Louis Park, its peak development occurred in the two decades following World War II, 
but because it covers a much larger area than either, it retained some undeveloped land 
into the 1980s (City of Bloomington 2009).  The population peaked at just over 86,000 in 
1990, and by 2007 it had dropped slightly to 85,504, though moderate growth is expected 
in the next 20 years (Minnesota State Demographic Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 
2009b).  Almost 57 percent of the total housing stock is single-family detached homes, 
most of which was built before 1960, but unlike St. Louis Park, there is a variety of size 
in single-family homes since portions of the city developed after 1960.  Housing does 
remain relatively affordable, with a 2000 median owner-occupied price of $147,000 and a 
median rent of $753.  Median household income is slightly above average at $54,638, 
and the household poverty rate is slightly above average at 4.00 percent (U.S. Census 
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Bureau 2009b).  Need for affordable housing is lower than in both other cities because 
Bloomington offers a large affordable housing stock while at the same time having a 
lower job proximity ratio due to many of its jobs being higher-paying corporate jobs. 
  Similar to other inner-ring suburbs, Bloomington views its most pressing housing 
concern as ensuring that its housing stock remains healthy, but it has a stronger 
commitment to increasing the affordable housing stock than St. Louis Park.  For example, 
the Comprehensive Plan 2000 states, ―The foremost housing priority is to keep the 
existing housing stock in good condition‖, and indeed one of the three housing goals is to 
achieve continued good maintenance (City of Bloomington 1999, p. 3.1).  Instead of 
simply adopting Metropolitan Council affordable housing goals, the plan also commits 
the city to increasing density and facilitating the construction of more affordable rental 
units.  The plan even goes so far as to specify that 100 units should be for small families, 
50 units should be for large families, and 30 units should be for special needs individuals 
(City of Bloomington 1999).  Of the case study cities, only Edina even attempted to 
specify in such detail its affordable housing plans, and ultimately it dropped the language.  
The new comprehensive plan makes no substantive changes in policy, indicating a 
continued and essentially unchanged stance towards affordable housing (City of 
Bloomington 2009).  Compared with St. Louis Park, Bloomington can afford to divide its 
efforts more evenly between rehabilitation or redevelopment and affordable housing 
because its housing stock is significantly more diverse in terms of age and size. 
 Bloomington used fewer policy instruments than other cities during the study 
period to promote affordable housing, but it was effective in encouraging affordable 
development.  Primarily the city contributed CDBG funds to projects that include 
83 
 
affordable units.  Major examples during the study period include The Crossings at 
Valley View, a 50-unit apartment building with all affordable units,
11
 the Lyndale 
Avenue Apartments, a 47-unit complex with 14 affordable townhomes, and Reflections, 
two mixed-income condominium buildings with 22 affordable units.  The city also 
expanded its scattered-site public housing program by six units in 2001 when it 
purchased several market-rate duplexes, tore them down, and rebuilt townhomes on the 
parcels (City of Bloomington HRA 2008).  Many smaller rental and owner-occupied 
projects across the city also included affordable units during the period, and received 
administrative support from the city in obtaining outside funds.  While Bloomington was 
clearly conducive to affordable development, it is important to note that The Crossings at 
Valley View replaced a 70-unit manufactured home park.
12
  The Shady Lane Park was 
likely the most affordable housing in the city, so the new development actually 
represented a net loss of affordable units at the site (Rockwood 2006). 
 Shady Lane was largely a victim of the constellation of economic constraints 
inner-ring suburbs face.  A Bloomington HRA staff member enumerated some of the 
main economic obstacles in Bloomington: 
One is finding land, finding a parcel that is large enough that you can get 
the scale that you need in order to do a project that‘s going to make 
financial sense, so you can get enough units on it.  And secondly, if you‘re 
doing affordable [housing], somebody‘s basically got to write a check at 
some point to subsidize the development. 
                                                          
11
 Residents did not being moving in until 2009, but the city contributed $600,000 in funding between 
2004 and 2007. 
12
 At the request of All Parks Alliance for Change, a tenants union for residents of manufactured home 
parks, I will use the term “manufactured home” instead of “mobile home” or “trailer.”  APAC points out 
that in most cases, the volume of repairs necessary to move a manufactured home from one park to 
another is so great that it is financially impossible for the resident to move the unit.  Therefore, the 
organization believes that referring to them as mobile homes or trailers reinforces the misconception that 
residents can easily move to another location if their park is closed. 
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As a result, the staff member added, ―It‘s very difficult to do redevelopment in most 
cases without some sort of city involvement.‖  As in any city, government involvement 
can be a powerful tool for affordable development because as the city staff member 
explained, ―If you‘re involved in the project and they‘re coming and asking you for 
money – that‘s one reason you want to be involved – is that you can influence what the 
project is going to be and if there‘s going to be housing on it, to make sure that some of it 
is going to be affordable.‖  Even though the city can pressure developers to include 
affordable units, it must also respond to the need to increase its tax base, which makes the 
continued existence of cheap but dilapidated housing such as Shady Lane tenuous from a 
fiscal perspective.  Furthermore, Shady Lane represented a rare instance in which a single 
owner possessed a parcel big enough to support a large multi-family redevelopment.  
Given the pressure to redevelop Shady Lane combined with city involvement, it is not 
surprising both that redevelopment occurred and that it included affordable units. 
Indeed, there is evidence that the city had fiscal considerations in mind during the 
park closure.  The HRA staff person explains, ―It [the closure] was completely private, so 
the city was not involved in that at all.‖  However, while the two respondents from All 
Parks Alliance for Change (APAC), a manufactured home park tenants union that 
unsuccessfully tried to prevent Shady Lane‘s closure, do not dispute the claim that it was 
a private transaction, the APAC staff member counters, ―They certainly weren‘t neutral 
referees in the process.  They had a number of comments along the way that made it 
fairly clear that they saw a benefit to the redevelopment project going forward, and we 
often received unsupportive feedback in attempting to make the counterargument for why 
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that land should be maintained as it was.‖  The APAC volunteer shared this view in 
saying, ―The city really wanted that park closed and out of there.‖ 
 Examining the impact of resident opposition, both in relation to Shady Lane and 
to other projects, begins to show dynamics very similar to those in cities I have 
previously discussed.  First, the HRA staff member noted, ―I think there‘s always that 
NIMBY factor, but surprisingly we have not seen that as much as in the past.‖  Still, the 
staff member added that first, ―People don‘t like rental housing,‖ and second, ―I‘m sure 
there are neighborhoods in the city that would fight tooth and nail if we tried to do a[n] 
[affordable] project.‖  Both the Lyndale Avenue Apartments and The Crossings at Valley 
View generated some opposition ostensibly as a result of density, aesthetics, and potential 
traffic congestion (City of Bloomington 2006; Rockwood 2001).  Several residents also 
spoke in support of The Crossings at Valley View, arguing that it would be superior to a 
manufactured home park (City of Bloomington 2006).  The City Council approved the 
former project unchanged despite the objections, whereas in the latter the developer 
lowered the height of one building, after which he received approval.  In addition, the 
expansion of the scattered-site public housing program received support because, as the 
HRA staff member explained, ―I know the neighborhood was very happy to see the – 
there was a series of old, crummy duplexes we acquired and took out that were notorious 
as far as police calls and bad tenants and that sort of stuff – so they were happy to see that 
go.‖  There were no examples of resident opposition derailing projects during the study 
period.  Opposition then has limited efficacy when projects do not differ significantly 
from the surrounding neighborhood. 
 
86 
 
Maple Grove – Lower Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity 
Like Plymouth, Maple Grove is a developing suburb with a predominantly 
affluent population.  Maple Grove remained relatively undeveloped until 1970, after 
which residential development began to accelerate.  The largest absolute increase in 
population of about 18,000 occurred between 1980 and 1990, but growth has continued at 
a rapid pace.  By 2000, the population had topped 50,000, and by 2007 it had reached 
59,458, though large tracts of land remain undeveloped, so the population will probably 
continue to grow quickly (City of Maple Grove 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).  
Through the 1980s, most of the development in the city was relatively affordable, and 
even by 2000 the median owner-occupied home value was only $155,300, but the city is 
rapidly shifting to a higher-end community.  Even in 2000, the median household income 
was a high $76,111, and by 2007, the median owner-occupied home value was $286,983.  
Rents have always been expensive in the city due to a low number of rental units, with 
the median rent being $891 in 2000 and $981 in 2008 (City of Maple Grove 2009; U.S. 
Census Bureau 2009b).  The city thus resembles Plymouth in many ways, although it has 
far fewer businesses and jobs due to its more recent development boom, which helps to 
explain its lower tax capacity per capita and lower need for affordable housing.  Before 
moving forward, it is also important to note that Maple Grove‘s matrix category has the 
most diverse group of cities in terms of housing dynamics, so even though it offers 
important insights about developing suburbs, arguably the areas with the most potential 
for affordable housing development, it is not fully representative of its category. 
 Maple Grove‘s affordable housing policies demonstrate that the text of written 
policies can obscure the reality of affordable housing development.  The City of Maple 
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Grove 1998 Comprehensive Plan presents the standard commitment to affordable 
housing of adopting Metropolitan Council goals and also notes that the city was the first 
to sign onto the Livable Communities Act (City of Maple Grove 1999).  It further states, 
―The City of Maple Grove promotes the accommodation of all racial and ethnic groups in 
the purchase, sale, rental, and location of housing within the city‖ (City of Maple Grove 
1999, p. 82).  However, the above plan came at the end of a period in which residents 
routinely packed City Council meetings to express their opposition to affordable housing 
proposals, even single-family detached Habitat for Humanity homes, singularly and 
explicitly because they included affordable units.  Moreover, the City Council usually 
heeded the opposition of residents during the late 1990s (Goetz 2003).  Such incidents 
occurred even in 1999 when the City Council approved the plan, which strongly indicates 
that the plan does not represent the reality of what the city would tolerate at that time. 
 The city‘s stated policy did not change significantly between 2000 and 2007, but 
the approach to affordable housing development began to align more closely with that 
policy.  First, the City of Maple Grove 2008 Comprehensive Plan again adopts 
Metropolitan Council goals and uses the exact same language in terms of accommodating 
all people.  But as the high proportion of the units that were affordable demonstrates, the 
city began to approve affordable units in far greater numbers.  An important indication 
that it has shifted to a more proactive approach was the adoption of the Project Points 
System in 2004.  Meant to encourage better-designed neighborhoods, the system requires 
developers to receive a certain number of points, which they obtain by meeting specific 
conditions, before they receive approval.  Developers receive points for including 
affordable units (City of Maple Grove 2009).   The city during the study period did not 
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contribute significant financial resources to affordable housing development, although it 
was active in helping developers leverage funds from other sources.  The major 
exceptions were three developments in the Gravel Mining Area, a gravel mine in which 
the city is underwriting many site preparation costs to develop a dense, mixed-use 
downtown on areas of the mine that are depleted (City of Maple Grove 2008). 
 The high proportion of affordable units in new developments does not mean there 
are not economic obstacles to its development.  Speaking about the largest obstacles, a 
city staff member explained, ―It‘s simply economics.  When you take the land value, 
which is something that a city really has very little control over, and the cost to build a 
structure, which again a city has very little control over, those things add up to be not 
affordable to a family.‖  The staff member added though, ―Things that we do I think well 
here is provide an ample amount of land for townhomes, medium density, higher density.  
We‘re starting to see more stuff in the Gravel Mining Area that has increased densities, 
so that you can have more units per acre, which can help bring down the cost per unit.‖  
Still, given that affordable developments in Maple Grove require outside funding, the 
staff member added the following challenge:  ―Each one of those [funding] sources may 
have different standards as far as how big a unit must be or how many bedrooms it must 
be, and trying to balance all of those requirements in order to get that grant has, I know, 
been exceptionally challenging for some of those folks [developers].‖ 
 Respondents‘ specific insights about developers and housing regulations present 
economic and political obstacles.  A member of Housing for All, an affordable housing 
advocacy group based in Maple Grove, said that during the comprehensive plan update 
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process, the organization pushed for inclusionary zoning, similar to that advocated for in 
Edina.  The individual explained: 
The city has been very resistant to that, partially because, I believe, 
because they invited what‘s called BATC, the Builders‘ Association of the 
Twin Cities, to come to some of those early meetings on that, and BATC, 
interestingly, if you talk about the concept of inclusionary housing with 
them, they say they support that, but they totally fight it when you say 
inclusionary housing and we want to have this in a community. 
 
The city staff member took a slightly different approach, arguing that the city would 
support inclusionary zoning if it were implemented on a regional scale, but that now state 
law does not adequately allow it, which would mean it would generate a law suit if the 
city passed an ordinance instituting it.  As a result, the staff member explained, ―So many 
of our resources would be spent on dealing with a lawsuit that it‘s not necessarily clear 
we would win because of how state law is written, that we‘re better off working with 
what we have right now and trying to encourage it [affordable housing] as much as 
possible.‖  What is clear is that powerful interests believe inclusionary housing would be 
too costly, and the city is unwilling to devote the resources necessary to implement it. 
 Resident opposition, while still existing, has ceased to be a major obstacle in 
Maple Grove, though its strength at one point in time demonstrates that it can be a 
powerful deterrent.  The member of Housing for All explained that in 1999, opposition 
was pervasive, but that now many projects receive approval without incident.  A recent 
example of an uncontroversial project was Maple Ridge Townhomes, 45-unit, all-
affordable development.  Even though the only access was through a neighborhood, the 
City Council encountered no major opposition and approved it (Miller 2006).  As the city 
staff member explained, ―I think in a city like Maple Grove where so many people who 
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are here are new, they recognize that it‘s growing and that there‘s going to be growth and 
that‘s just part of the process for a long time in the city.‖  The statistical analysis offered 
no broad support for the hypothesis, but it may be true in Maple Grove.  Another project, 
Maple Village, a 104-unit, all-affordable apartment complex, generated significant 
opposition from a neighborhood abutting the site.  Interestingly, residents said they 
opposed it because highway noise from Interstate 94 would have exceeded state 
regulations and thus negatively impacted the new residents (Miller 2007a).  In spite of the 
opposition though, the City Council approved the project at the end of 2007 (Miller 
2007b).  In regards to the project, the city staff member explained: 
It is hard to say what their exact motives are without being in their mind, 
but there were a number of issues that were brought up that were 
seemingly brought up to, in the idea that we‘re trying to help the people 
out that are going to be living here and make it better for them, that were a 
little bit over and above what you would normally expect.  There seemed 
to be an impression of trying to stall and block it from happening using 
these things. 
 
The Housing for All member stated that in private meetings with residents, ―It was more 
quote on quote ‗those people,‘ they won‘t fit in, that type of thing.‖  What changed so 
that such opposition was ineffective is unclear.  It is possible that once some affordable 
projects were developed at the end of the 1990s, affordable housing began to seem less 
threatening.  What is important though is that Maple Grove demonstrates that expensive, 
developing suburbs can be leaders in affordable housing development. 
 
Minnetrista – Lower Need, Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity 
 Almost 25 miles from downtown Minneapolis, Minnetrista is a predominantly 
wealthy, sparsely populated, semi-rural city.  It did not incorporate as a city until the 
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1970s, and it continued to have a relatively small population of 6,234 in 2007.  Though 
the population is small in comparison with most of the case study cities, it has been 
experiencing rapid relative growth.  Between 1990 and 2000, the population grew almost 
27 percent, and between 2000 and 2007 it grew over 43 percent.  In 2000, 1,382 out of 
1,443 housing units were single-family units, and 95 percent of all units were owner-
occupied.  Housing costs are very high, with the median owner-occupied unit being 
valued at $278,500 and the median rent at $1,083 in 2000.  Income is also high, with a 
median household income in 2000 of $90,347.  The household poverty rate in the same 
year was a low 2.39 percent (City of Minnetrista 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).  As a 
result of the general wealth of its residents and its distance from major job centers, 
Minnetrista‘s need for affordable housing is slightly lower than the study area median. 
 City policies related to housing make affordable development very difficult.  The 
1999 Comprehensive Plan states as its first housing goal, ―Preserve Minnetrista‘s rural 
character‖ (City of Minnetrista 1999, p. 5.6).  The plan does present the possibility of 
higher density multiple-family housing, but it only uses the terms ―allow up to‖ and 
―consider‖ in relation to such development and does not make a definitive statement 
calling for it.  Indeed such development has not yet occurred.  In the 2008 
Comprehensive Plan Review Draft, it accepts the Metropolitan Council‘s affordable 
housing goal of 209 new affordable units between 2011 and 2020, but calls for 
cumulative density in newly developed areas to not exceed the Metropolitan Council 
minimum density of 3.0 units per acre.  The high density area that will likely 
accommodate all of the affordable units is in one area of southeastern Minnetrista.  The 
city has no HRA, public housing, or assisted housing (City of Minnetrista 2009). 
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 Part of the explanation for Minnetrista‘s scant development of affordable housing 
is a set of economic restraints related to its rural character.  Land values are very high, 
partially as a result of natural amenities such as Lake Minnetonka and the rural character, 
but also because of the city‘s low density limits.  Notably, Mound, a case study city 
bordering Minnetrista on the east in which 58 percent of the housing stock was affordable 
in 2000, suggests that affordability is possible around Lake Minnetonka.  Despite the 
partially self-created constraints, it may be difficult for Minnetrista to increase density 
and maintain its high tax capacity per capita.  As the respondent from Minnetrista 
explained, ―The primary goal is to maintain the existing quality of housing.  People 
always say it‘s kind of a euphemism for, ‗We want high-end housing.‘  The reason for 
that is tax-base reasons.  A place like Mound has a lot of commercial, so you kind of have 
to make a choice.  Do you want to encourage and do whatever you can to keep high-end 
housing, or do you want to allow commercial?‖  The respondent later explained, ―They 
[city councilors] have intentionally chosen not to have commercial, and have 
intentionally chosen to encourage high-end housing by squeaking up those lot sizes.‖ 
 At the same time though, much of the existing population has a strong desire and 
interest in restricting any type of growth in Minnetrista, but especially growth in 
affordable housing.  The respondent explained that residents in Minnetrista are prone to 
react negatively to high-density and lower-cost housing, but then added, ―The residents in 
Minneapolis are just as concerned about their property values and the perception of 
density and the perception of renters as the people out here.  They really are.  They just 
have less to lose.‖  City Council action strongly reflects the desire to maintain low 
density.  Beyond enshrining that value in the last two comprehensive plans, it has 
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disputed density regulations with the Metropolitan Council.  In 2006, the Metropolitan 
Council sanctioned the city for developing below the 2.2 unit per acre limit prescribed for 
cities such as Minnetrista.  According to the respondent, the city councilors resented the 
action, but had no choice but to amend the 1999 Comprehensive Plan to accept a 3.0 unit 
per acre overall density floor after 2008 (Schwarze 2006).  In addition, two developments 
that were proposed during the study period only received preliminary approval after 
lowering the density to the minimum allowed by zoning (Schwarze 2007a; 2007b).  One, 
Halstead Pointe, received preliminary approval slightly after the study period
13
 for a plan 
above the maximum density, but the site is a manufactured home park and city councilors 
expressed a desire to ―clean up the park.‖  Some nearby residents, however, were 
concerned about the density (Schwarze 2008). 
 Minnetrista‘s approach to affordable housing would be concerning if it were a 
more populous area with a higher need for affordable housing, but it is unlikely that such 
a place with opposition like that in Minnetrista would exist in the Twin Cities.  
Minnetrista clearly intends to exclude the kinds of housing that could be affordable, 
though it will probably permit some due to Metropolitan Council pressure.  That intent, 
however, flows from a desire to maintain a rural aesthetic.  Such a desire would not exist 
closer to the central cities where there would be a heightened need for affordable housing.  
Minnetrista therefore represents a highly unusual situation that while informative, is not 
as problematic as exclusion in Edina. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 I am including this example because it represents the culmination of a process that occurred almost 
completely within the study period. 
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Mound – Lower Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity 
 Mound is a fully developed suburb on the western edge of Lake Minnetonka with 
a large supply of affordable housing.  The city began as a lake cabin retreat in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and then grew rapidly in 1950s and 1960s.  By 1980, the city had become 
fully developed, so the limited amount of new building is typically infill redevelopment 
(City of Mound 2007).  Seventy-seven percent of the housing is single-family detached, 
and 80 percent of the total stock is owner-occupied (City of Mound 2007; U.S. Census 
Bureau 2009b).  The population in 2007 was estimated to be 9,753.  The median 
household income in 2000 was $60,671, and the percent of households in poverty was 
3.34, making it comparable to the study area average.  Housing costs in Mound are some 
of the lowest in the study area, with a 2000 median owner-occupied home value of 
$140,300 and a median rent of $581 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).  Accordingly, as the 
case study selection data indicate, Mound fulfills the affordable housing needs of most of 
its residents.  Moreover, its distance from most job centers means that it does not have a 
strong imperative to increase its affordable housing stock. 
The city‘s official policies are supportive of affordable housing development, 
although they do not recognize additional affordable development as a top priority.  The 
only goal in the 2000 Mound Comprehensive Plan related to housing states, ―Provide 
opportunities for all residents, supporting creative multi-family housing while 
emphasizing the construction and maintenance of high quality, single-family dwelling 
units‖ (City of Mound 2000, p. 3.3).  None of the six policies listed to achieve this goal 
mention affordability, and one specifically states, ―Maintain the predominantly single 
family housing base throughout the city‖ (City of Mound 2000, p. 3.3).  Given the 
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general affordability of Mound‘s housing stock, however, such a goal would not have had 
the effect of inhibiting affordable development.  The 2010 Mound Comprehensive Plan 
Draft takes largely the same approach, though it uses slightly more forceful language in 
support of affordable housing in the single housing goal, which reads, ―Promote and 
encourage the provision of life-cycle housing opportunities for all residents, supporting 
creative multi-family housing while emphasizing the construction and maintenance of 
high quality, single-family dwelling units‖ (City of Mound 2007, p. 3.2).  One of the six 
policies specifically calls on the city to ―[p]romote and support the development of new 
affordable housing units‖ (City of Mound 2007, p. 3.3).  Because so little affordable 
development occurred in the study period, it is difficult to know which tools the city 
would use to promote affordable housing.  The city does, however, have an HRA that 
manages a public housing building, and it has used TIF districts for other projects, so 
there is some precedent for active involvement in the development process. 
The biggest challenge to developing new affordable units will be finding land and 
providing funding.  As already stated, there are very few vacant parcels of land in Mound.  
Second, the city‘s small tax capacity per capita limits its ability to directly provide 
funding and induces it to favor more expensive development.  A large project that began 
during the study period and is aimed at redeveloping the downtown is emblematic of this 
challenge.  The respondent in Mound explained: 
Our downtown redevelopment plan focused on a wide range of housing, 
different styles of housing, mixed use, vertically integrated, but it was 
anticipated that, for the project to work, it would be of a medium to higher 
value.  It had to make the numbers work.  At that time, there was not an 
affordable component included in there, and it wasn‘t proposed from the 
developer as well.  And I think there‘s also some thought process that 
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substantial improvement in the tax base of downtown Mound would be a 
benefit. 
 
Speaking more generally about affordable housing in Mound, the respondent stated, 
―We‘ve not done an affordable housing project here yet, mainly because I‘m not certain 
that the city has the financial wherewithal to do it by itself.  We would need some sort of 
partner.‖  Of course, the city could raise taxes, but it is unlikely that it would do so.  
Nevertheless, because of the low value of land in Mound, new development is 
occasionally affordable even without subsidies.  Village by the Bay, a project with 99 
housing units, some of which are affordable, was built during the study period.  It 
provided the bulk of the affordable units added during the study period.  A for-profit 
developer built the project without using public money. 
 Public opposition to affordable housing did not prove to be a major issue during 
the study period.  According to the respondent, Village by the Bay generated some 
concern among nearby residents because it was going replace a closed school that some 
of the residents would have preferred to become a community center.  The opposition 
was not stiff though, and the project went forward.  The primary reason opposition was 
minimal is probably that on one side of the project is a major road, so even though the 
surrounding neighborhoods are composed of single-family homes, it is doubtful that the 
residents would have been surprised to hear that higher density development was being 
proposed.  Also, the fact that all of its units are market-rate may have mitigated potential 
opposition.  Village by the Bay‘s easy approval combined with the comprehensive plan 
shows that there is no intent to exclude affordable housing from Mound. 
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Chapter Five:  Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 From the rich body of data provided by the statistical analysis and the case studies 
it is possible to draw general conclusions about regional affordable housing dynamics.  
The case study suburbs do not represent the full range of city types in Hennepin County, 
and therefore do not precisely represent the dynamics in other cities.  However, they do 
provide a good approximation by encompassing a broad spectrum of housing dynamics 
and correspond well to the county-wide statistical findings.  Consequently, they can 
represent more general trends across Hennepin County and the Twin Cities region.  In the 
following sections of this chapter, I will highlight such trends as I integrate and analyze 
my results to address the four research questions presented in Chapter One. 
 
Research Question One:  What are the major factors influencing the development and 
placement of affordable housing at the metropolitan scale? 
 With shocking consistency, the results indicate that the local economics of 
housing development combined with a political calculus centering on developers‘ 
interests and taxation are the strongest predictors of the distribution of affordable housing 
development.  In every case study except Mound, respondents cited high land values as a 
deterrent to affordable development.  Mound though is a low-need area with limited 
development potential, so it is insignificant to the broader development of affordable 
housing that land is comparatively cheap there.  In addition, respondents from fully 
developed suburbs facing possible fiscal decline such as St. Louis Park and Mound 
expressed that their cities have a strong incentive to promote higher-value development, 
98 
 
just as Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) argue.  Finally, the fact that the percent affordable 
of the total housing stock in 2000 is the most statistically significant variable in 
predicting affordable development in the study period, and is positively correlated, offers 
support for high land value precluding increased affordable development. 
Likewise, affordable housing thrives where it can make a positive contribution to 
a city‘s fiscal standing.  In the cases of Bloomington and St. Louis Park, redevelopment is 
the only way to grow the tax base, and many of the necessary subsidies for 
redevelopment require the inclusion of affordable units.  In Plymouth, Stone Creek 
Village occupied a marginal site that probably would not have been developed by a for-
profit developer, and in Maple Grove, affordable housing has proven an effective way to 
get development in the Gravel Mining Area.  As I will discuss at length in the following 
section, resident opposition only has the ability to shape affordable development, but 
does not play a major factor in the metropolitan geography of that development. 
 We cannot view economic constraints as autonomous forces though, since the 
case studies strongly demonstrate that those constraints are inextricably linked to local 
politics.  The respondent from PPL explained, ―I don‘t want to say it‘s [land value] a non-
issue because of course more expensive suburbs will drive up the cost, but I will say that 
I think there are some public agencies who see the value of having affordable housing in 
some of the more expensive suburbs.‖  Moreover, the private citizen from Edina noted 
that comparably expensive suburbs such as Plymouth and Minnetonka have managed to 
encourage large proportions of affordable development whereas Edina has not.  Indeed, 
the Metropolitan Council has stated that it sees value to having affordable housing in all 
areas, and will subsidize a development regardless of its location.  The federal 
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government and state agencies will also subsidize development in most areas.  Such 
points demonstrate that other contingent forces also play a role. 
 In several case study cities, one force was the politics of taxation circumscribing 
the economic realm in which city governments made decisions.  Minnesota law does not 
cap the property tax rates cities can charge, so hypothetically a city could simply raise 
taxes in order to generate the revenue necessary to subsidize affordable development.  
Elected officials are accountable to residents though, and most residents are unwilling to 
pay higher taxes, especially for housing that would not personally benefit them.  
Respondents in Plymouth, Spring Park, and Minnetrista communicated such a constraint, 
albeit to a different extent in each city.  While the issue did not come up in other cities, 
there is no reason to believe that it does not restrict the action of city governments.  The 
emergent theme echoes Peterson‘s (1981) argument, which states that cities have a very 
limited capacity to fund projects that do not contribute to their overall economic 
wellbeing and that they cannot raise taxes significantly above those of other cities 
without driving out residents and businesses.  Peterson, however, assumes that the same 
dynamics prevail throughout a metropolitan area, whereas my results show that the 
electorate of each city has different expectations regarding taxation.  My research does 
not attempt to explain in-depth the politics of taxation in each city, though doing so 
would surely allow a more precise analysis of affordable housing dynamics. 
 The role of subsidies both supports and complicates Peterson‘s thesis in relation 
to affordable housing.  He recognizes that goals such as affordable housing development 
are important, but given the economic constraints cities face, feels that only higher levels 
of government can accomplish them.  Indeed, higher levels of government such as the 
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Metropolitan Council, MHFA, and HUD partially funded all large-scale affordable 
housing projects in the case study cities.  However, most of the same projects also 
received city funding through bonds, TIF, and other instruments.  Plymouth, the city with 
the most aggressive subsidy policy, has a solid fiscal standing and appears to only be 
getting stronger, not weaker as Peterson would predict.  Furthermore, the use of higher 
government subsidies that required affordable units was only absolutely necessary in 
Bloomington and St. Louis Park, where developers would be unable to build without 
subsidies due to high redevelopment costs.  In other cases, affordable development was a 
result of a non-profit developer voluntarily drawing on such subsidies or city pressure to 
include affordable units.  In those cases, development would not have included affordable 
units without subsidies, but it could have gone forward in some other form with purely 
private funding.  An element of politics then is involved in most decisions to use 
affordable housing subsidies, as evidenced by the PPL respondent‘s statement that, ―One 
of the things I‘ve seen in some suburbs is a city council who is persuaded to participate in 
some funding, in some positive way in supporting affordable housing, largely because 
there is one or two people on that council who understand housing is an issue and end up 
being advocates, and if those people leave the council, the attitude and opinion can 
change just that fast.‖  Any comprehensive geography of affordable housing then must 
include an understanding of the politics of leaders throughout the region. 
 Focusing only on the perspective of cities and their residents though obscures the 
impact of developers on affordable housing dynamics.  First, the example of BATC 
resisting inclusionary zoning proposals in Maple Grove indicates that the Twin Cities 
development community is broadly opposed to stringent affordable housing regulations 
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because of the impact they would have on profitability.  Second, respondents often speak 
of having to encourage or require developers to include affordable units, with the obvious 
implication that they do not originally include them in their plans.  Taken together with 
the previous point, it is clear that developers do not view affordable housing development 
as being in their best interests.  Finally, that numerous projects received approval despite 
significant opposition signals that in many city governments a pro-growth attitude 
aligned with developers‘ interests trumps the opposition of some residents.  By figuring 
prominently in city policies, developers‘ interests probably result in a smaller overall 
production of affordable housing than would otherwise occur.  Such a dynamic is a 
perfect example of the growth machine described by Logan (1976) and Logan and 
Molotch (1987), and accordingly presents a more complicated picture than Peterson of 
why insufficient amounts of affordable housing are developed in most suburbs.  Where 
developers are more active, namely developing suburbs, we can expect their interests to 
shape development to a greater extent than elsewhere. 
 A final political consideration is that businesses and residents place little pressure 
on cities for affordable development, and also have little ability to stop it.  While many 
businesses support the idea of affordable housing because many of their workers need it, 
they do not appear to invest much effort into its development.  For instance, in Plymouth 
and Maple Grove, the strongest advocates for affordable housing were faith-based 
organizations, not businesses.  Except in the case of executives from a hospital under 
construction in Maple Grove, businesses did not appear at contentious city council 
meetings to voice support for affordable projects.  One possible reason proposed by the 
Maple Grove city staff person was that most businesses are headquartered outside of the 
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Twin Cities, and so have little connection to local housing matters.  In regards to 
residents, only in Edina was there significant concern among some residents that housing 
was unaffordable, and still that did not prove strong enough to encourage development 
during the study period.  At the same time, only in Edina and Minnetrista is it possible to 
demonstrate that resident opposition or the threat of it blocked affordable housing 
development, a point I will address at length in the next section.  As Logan and Molotch 
(1987) would predict then, residents and non-place-based businesses have little impact on 
housing dynamics. 
 
Research Question Two:  Can resident opposition be broadly effective in blocking 
affordable housing development?  If so, under what circumstances is it effective? 
 There is irrefutable evidence in the study area that resident opposition can block 
development, but there are so few examples of it that it becomes clear that the 
NIMBYism argument cannot explain the distribution of affordable housing development.  
Maple Grove stands out among the case study cities as the only one where resident 
opposition to affordable housing for the sole reason that it was affordable proved in 
recent years to significantly limit development, and even it eventually embraced 
affordable housing.  Edina and Minnetrista are examples of where the broader politics of 
development have limited affordable housing development by precluding the types of 
land uses that could financially support such development.  The critical point then is that 
it would be erroneous to discount the potential impact of resident opposition on 
affordable development. 
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 Nonetheless, opposition or the potential for it had little effect in the study area on 
the geography of affordable housing development.  First, we would expect either or both 
of the means for percent of the population of adjacent cities being in poverty or being 
minority to have a negative correlation to the percent affordable of total development if a 
desire to exclude was indeed influencing development, as Rolleston (1987) argues.  The 
correlations for both though are slightly positive and statistically insignificant.  Even 
median household income, for which a negative correlation might indicate that suburbs 
with more affluent populations were attempting to exclude affordable housing, is not 
statistically significant.  Indeed, the case studies revealed very little stiff opposition.  The 
only project that generated an overwhelmingly negative response that appears to be 
strongly related to affordability was Maple Village in Maple Grove, but the City Council 
approved the project without changes.  Edina is another example of opposition, but due to 
being fully developed, there are relatively few opportunities for affordable development 
in the city anyway.  We would expect opposition in Minnetrista, but it is a low-need area, 
so the opposition is relatively unimportant. 
 Many affordable housing proposals generated some opposition, but affordability 
was almost never what residents were protesting.  In Plymouth, St. Louis Park, 
Bloomington, and Maple Grove, residents frequently cited traffic and density as reasons 
to oppose a project.  The PPL project in St. Louis Park generated some concern for the 
effect that bringing poor residents into the area might have, but it never evolved into 
outright opposition.  In Bloomington, opposition resulted in the developer of The 
Crossings at Valley View reducing the height of the building, and in St. Louis Park it 
resulted in the developer of Aquila Commons reducing the density of the buildings and 
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reorienting them, but those are the only examples of a project changing after reaching the 
formal proposal stage.  In all cases it is possible, as Pendall (1999) suggests that concerns 
about traffic, density, and aesthetics are simply masking an anti-affordable housing bias, 
and indeed numerous respondents believed that this was the case.  However, that The 
Crossings at Valley View and Aquila Commons successfully mitigated opposition by 
addressing those concerns and that even high-value projects such as Lakeshore Lofts and 
The Mist in Spring Park generated opposition nearly identical to that of the affordable 
projects suggests that anti-affordable housing bias is not the primary motivation of 
residents.  Whatever the motivations for opposition, city councils did not reject any 
affordable housing projects that reached the formal proposal stage. 
 The question then arises of who has the power to influence decisions related to 
affordable housing.  It is easy to dismiss residents through both Peterson‘s (1981) and 
Logan‘s and Molotch‘s (1987) models, but the role of residents in the political economy 
of affordable housing development is more complicated than either model would suggest.  
First, respondents in every city were aware of resident preferences for lower-density, 
owner-occupied housing.  Second, the non-profit employee respondents and the 
developer both recognized that opposition is something that developers must strategically 
plan to counter.  Third, only in the case of The Crossings at Valley was a new project 
much higher density than in the surrounding neighborhood.  Finally, in no cities would 
projects be immediately identifiable as affordable housing in the way that inner-city 
housing projects developed in the 1960s and 1970s were.   
The above points suggest that anticipated resident opposition ensures that 
developers plan affordable housing projects to be on carefully chosen sites and to blend 
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into surrounding neighborhoods in order to mitigate resident opposition.  When projects 
do not significantly disrupt the status quo, city councils are unlikely to deny them due to 
the economic advantages development can bring and the political pressure from the 
Metropolitan Council to encourage affordable development.  Such a dynamic points to a 
restricted form of Stone‘s (1989; 1993) regime theory.  Middle-class homeowners form 
the political base of most of the case study cities.  Inasmuch as their preferences 
circumscribe government action and influence developers, they constitute a weak regime 
that can require some consideration for the use values of their homes.  An earlier study I 
conducted of Heart of the City, a large mixed-use development including affordable 
housing in Burnsville, Minnesota, a Dakota County suburb bordering Bloomington to the 
south, reinforces the finding.  Though there was minimal resident opposition to including 
affordable units, the city adopted extremely high aesthetic standards for the buildings and 
used the term ―workforce housing‖ instead of ―affordable housing‖ in an effort to 
preempt potential resistance.  Residents did not directly impact the decision to include 
affordable units, but their known preferences influenced the character of the development. 
 It is possible that the threat of resident opposition broadly limits affordable 
housing development in suburbs.  Indeed, the PPL respondent explained that a potential 
project in Richfield never went forward to a proposal because resident opposition was 
already stiff.  Evaluating the possibility throughout the metropolitan area is very difficult 
though, since it involves uncovering what might have occurred but did not.  However, it 
is unlikely to be a major explanatory factor.  A respondent from a secondary study that I 
conducted in Richfield, a suburb similar to St. Louis Park but in more danger of fiscal 
decline, believed opposition may have been motivated by racial and class prejudice to the 
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poor Latinos that would primarily have resided in the project, but another respondent 
noted that the project was high-density in a single-family neighborhood.  Opposition was 
thus not inconsistent with the opposition seen in the case study cities.  Furthermore, we 
would, in general, expect to see stronger resistance from residents in city council 
meetings throughout the county if the possibility of opposition was a significant deterrent 
to even proposing projects.  Nevertheless, potential opposition probably does influence 
the development geography within cities by limiting the number of viable sites. 
 
Research Question Three:  Is there intent by suburban cities to exclude affordable 
housing? 
 The results do not reveal widespread intent to exclude affordable housing.  
Plymouth, Maple Grove, and Bloomington actively sought new affordable housing.  
Bloomington did support the removal of some of its most affordable housing in the Shady 
Lane Park, which indicates that suburbs may exclude the cheapest and most unsightly 
housing, but it hardly indicates a deep-seated intent to exclude.  St. Louis Park and 
Mound were less active in seeking new affordable housing, but were supportive of 
preserving their current affordable housing stock and welcomed some new units.  
Although Spring Park saw no affordable development, there is no reason to believe that it 
would attempt to exclude it.  In contrast, Edina and Minnetrista did demonstrate intent to 
exclude the kinds of housing that could be affordable in those cities, but not necessarily 
intent to exclude housing on the basis of affordability.  In both cities, residents were 
highly opposed to the increased density that would be needed to allow for affordable 
units.  It is possible that residents have strong anti-affordable housing biases, but it may 
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also be that they have a strong value of a particular aesthetic that is not compatible with 
affordable housing, as Duncan and Duncan (2006) describe in the upscale New York City 
suburb of Bedford.  That there is only weak evidence, at best, to support intent to exclude 
affordable housing in the most upscale suburbs in the sample highlights the weakness of 
the NIMBYism argument in explaining the continued shortage of affordable housing in 
suburban areas. 
 
Research Question Four:  Is there continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that 
influence the development and placement of affordable housing that a model can describe? 
 As the general weakness of the statistical model indicates, a mathematical model 
would be difficult to develop, but several continuities do exist across the study area.  The 
model‘s weakness is not surprising given the wide deviations from the regression just in 
the case study cities.  For instance, Plymouth had a low percentage of affordable units at 
the beginning of the study period, yet it still developed a high proportion of affordable 
units over the next seven years.  Further research could probably develop a stronger 
mathematical model, but the heavy importance of difficult-to-quantify political factors 
would continue to hinder the model‘s explanatory power.  Consequently, focusing on 
qualitative continuities among cities would be a more productive approach to future 
research.  My research has revealed five major continuities that will be useful in 
developing a model of affordable housing development.  First, all cities try to maintain 
and enhance their fiscal standing.  Second, in cases when affordable housing represents 
redevelopment, development of a challenging site, or development that would not have 
otherwise occurred, it can be fiscally beneficial to a city even if it requires subsidies.  
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Third, the only cities absolutely requiring subsidies for development are fully developed 
areas not in the upper echelons of land value.  Fourth, most suburban electoral 
constituencies do not demand affordable housing.  Fifth, it is difficult for residents to 
successfully oppose a project when it does not deviate significantly from the surrounding 
developments in appearance and density.  Accordingly, to develop a model, it would be 
useful to catalog areas where affordable development would be advantageous to the fiscal 
standing of a city and would be aesthetically similar to other development in the city. 
 
Implications for Political Economy of Place Theory 
 Structuralism tempered by elements of a growth machine and regime politics 
emerges as the political economy of affordable housing development.  Suburbs must 
maintain their fiscal standing and so are not keen to spend tax dollars on affordable 
housing unless that housing has a positive impact on their fiscal statuses.  Evaluating 
where such a positive effect can occur goes a long way to understanding the geography of 
affordable housing development.  At the same time, developers are a powerful influence 
in most city governments, and many resist calls for mandated affordable housing 
development, limiting affordable development across the metropolitan area.  The regime 
of middle-class residents has little say in whether most projects get approved, but that is 
primarily because the threat of its opposition ensures that the projects are of a sufficiently 
high quality to receive approval.  There is no widespread intent to exclude affordable 
housing, but the economic and political structures in which suburbs exist restrict 
affordable development to varying degrees depending on the local context. 
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion 
 A detailed analysis of affordable housing dynamics in Hennepin County‘s suburbs 
both supports and challenges the conventional narratives of affordable housing 
development.  The economic forces identified by many authors are a powerful factor in 
shaping the geography of affordable housing development.  However, economic 
constraints are not simply the product of autonomous market forces, but reflect the 
political and economic interests of developers and middle-class residents, two important 
suburban constituencies.  My research then is a strong testament to the false nature of the 
dichotomy between politics and economics that pervades the applied literature.  Also 
striking, though, is the weak impact of resident opposition on affordable housing 
development.  Residents certainly shape the types and intra-city locations of projects 
developers propose, but they are highly ineffective at blocking projects outright when 
they do not deviate significantly from surrounding areas in terms of density and 
appearance.  Unusually strong opposition does block projects, but most residents are 
either not so strongly opposed or are unwilling to mount the effort necessary to block the 
project.  The finding that resident opposition is weak thus seriously undermines the 
applicability of conventional NIMBYism literature to affordable housing development.  
A more fruitful approach would analyze the more subtle impact of anticipated opposition 
on the distribution of affordable housing development.  
 The findings are both heartening and discouraging in the context of improving 
affordable housing policy to better promote development in the areas needing it most.   
More than any other finding, the weakness of resident opposition highlights the broad 
latitude policymakers have to develop more aggressive public policies.  Even though 
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policies would be unlikely to generate widespread enthusiastic support among suburban 
residents, most of those same residents would not obstruct the policies out of opposition 
to having more affordable housing in their cities.  This finding completely alters the 
perception of the political climate within which policymakers believe they are operating.  
It is also promising that, owing to the preeminence of economic forces in affordable 
housing development, more financial resources and a refined incentive structure could go 
a long way towards achieving a more optimum quantity and distribution of such 
development.  The necessity of an economic remedy is simultaneously very discouraging.  
It would, of course, require certain levels of government to devote more resources to 
affordable housing, which is not an important political issue to most people.  It is difficult 
to imagine a scenario in which a majority of the population would support increasing 
taxes or cutting funding from other programs to support affordable housing development.  
However, just as the finding that resident opposition was weaker than expected was 
surprising, more support may exist than we currently believe. 
 Certain policies could be effective in the Twin Cities regardless of the amount of 
additional funding available.  Counties, the Metropolitan Council, state agencies, and the 
federal government should refine their subsidy structures to offer larger subsidies in 
higher need areas than lower need areas.  The only places affordable housing subsidies 
were absolutely necessary for development to occur were in developed, inner-ring 
suburbs, whereas the use of subsidies in higher need developing areas relied on 
developers voluntarily drawing on them or city councils demanding their use.  A for-
profit developer under no pressure could have declined subsidies and developed a project 
with no affordable units.  A more compelling subsidy in higher need areas could spur 
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more developers to draw voluntarily on the subsidy.  Governments could accomplish 
such a policy with no additional funding by shifting the way they spend current levels of 
resources, though it would be more effective with additional resources.  Nonetheless, it 
would be important to compensate for reductions in suburbs in danger of fiscal decline 
that rely on redevelopment subsidies for new projects that expand the tax base.  However 
policymakers refine subsidies, they should couple those efforts with a streamlining of 
subsidies into a smaller number of programs that are easier to access.  Doing so would 
reduce the expertise needed to develop affordable housing, making more for-profit 
developers willing to participate. 
 If a politically favorable climate existed, several additional policy changes would 
vastly expand affordable housing development in the Twin Cities.  Inclusionary zoning 
would be the most direct way to address the presently low quantities of development, 
though it would require the state legislature to change state law to permit inclusionary 
zoning, and would also probably require state action to require all cities in the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area to adopt it.  The state legislature could also take into account 
each city‘s relative success with affordable housing development when determining 
future aid payments to cities.  Those cities that are less successful or less willing would 
lose a portion of their aid, or if they receive no aid, would have to pay a penalty, and 
those that are successful would receive a bonus.  Doing so would offset the fiscal benefits 
of avoiding affordable housing development and the fiscal consequences of pursuing it.  
With both measures though, the state would need to increase its funding to cities in order 
to effectively address the underlying economic structures that impede affordable housing 
development and to avoid charges of creating an unfunded mandate. 
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 Potential city-level policies are more modest.  Most importantly, city 
policymakers should recognize that in most instances, their constituents will not vote 
them out of office for approving well-designed affordable housing developments, and so 
they should not resist or stall such projects.  Cities should also be more proactive in 
identifying sites where affordable housing is feasible, because there are non-profit 
developers anxious to find good sites.  Finally, cities should not resist new metropolitan 
area-wide affordable housing policies when those policies address the underlying 
economic forces that may make it advantageous to favor higher value development.  
Most cities would benefit from such policies in increased funding. 
 There is little reason to believe that economic factors would not also prevail in 
other metropolitan areas in the United States, but more research is needed to understand 
if the policies that would be effective in the Twin Cities would be effective nationally.  
The role of resident opposition is the area most in need of attention.  Maple Grove in the 
1990s demonstrates that when it is severe, resident opposition can block affordable 
housing development.  Consequently, my research cannot rule out the possibility that 
resident opposition is a powerful explanatory force in other metropolitan areas lacking 
strong government support for affordable housing development.  Furthermore, my 
research does not address the reasons opposition is not strong in the Twin Cities.  Strong 
federal policy would require an understanding of the dynamics in all metropolitan areas, 
and if opposition is indeed a problem in some, it would require knowledge of strategies 
for reducing broad opposition.  The Twin Cities could provide an ideal environment for 
studying the latter question. 
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 Uncovering the factors that produce different policy outcomes from seemingly 
similar cities would be a boon to policymaking in both the Twin Cities and elsewhere.  
Altering the economics of housing development may be the clearest path to success in 
increasing affordable housing development, but the fact still remains that it will not solve 
a portion of the problem.  The political beliefs of residents towards issues of taxation and 
government involvement in social policy as well as the personal leadership qualities of 
elected officials appear to affect the distribution of affordable housing development, yet 
my study only began to address such factors, and theory offers few potential hypotheses.  
A detailed political geography of the suburbs would provide invaluable information that 
would enable policymakers to tailor policies to unique local circumstances and thus 
account for the explicitly political aspects of development that more resources and a 
refined incentive structure will not change. 
 Armed with the information we need to effectively intervene in an undeniably 
pressing issue, there would be no excuse not to develop new affordable housing policies.  
Benefits would be spread across society, with low-income households gaining access to 
jobs and beneficial neighborhood characteristics previously out of reach, moderate-
income households being able to access the best schools possible, and all people facing 
less traffic, commute time, and pollution.  Our cities would be more fiscally secure, 
which would in turn safeguard all households‘ financial investments in their homes.  The 
sacrifices would be few, limited only to a small possible increase in taxes and the 
willingness of residents to reevaluate their personal views on living in a socio-
economically diverse area.  It is within our reach to create a more equitable housing 
geography in the Twin Cities and the rest of the United States.  Let us now do it. 
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Appendix One:  Affordable Housing Financing Programs 
 
Major Programs for Rental Housing Development Available in Hennepin County 
Program Name Type of 
Assistance 
Description 
Low and Moderate 
Income Rental Program 
(LMIR) 
Amortizing 
first mortgage 
loan 
Mortgage funds for new construction/substantial 
rehabilitation of rental housing, or refinance/debt-restructure 
Flexible Financing for 
Capital Costs 
Deferred loan Loan provided in conjunction with LMIR loan 
Housing Tax Credit 
Program 
Tax credit Provides Tax Credits to reduce federal income tax liability for 
qualifying property owners who agree to rent to low and 
moderate income tenants 
Preservation 
Affordable/Rental 
Investment Fund 
Deferred loan Loans for acquisition/rehabilitation, debt restructuring or 
equity takeout 
Housing Trust Fund 
Capital 
Deferred loan Development, construction, acquisition, preservation, and 
rehabilitation of low-income rental housing 
Housing Trust Fund and 
Ending Long-Term 
Homelessness Initiative 
Operating Subsidy 
Grant Operating subsidies are available to fund two forms of 
operating expenses: 
1) Unique costs of supportive housing developments that are 
critical to both the economic viability of the building and 
households being served 
2)  Revenue shortfall to reduce the difference between costs 
of operating and the rents that tenants are charged 
Housing Trust Fund and 
Ending Long-Term 
Homelessness Initiative 
Rental Assistance 
Grant Rental assistance is available in two forms: 
1)  Tenant-based rental assistance program funds 
2)  Sponsor-based rental assistance program funds 
Ending Long-Term 
Homelessness Initiative 
Fund 
Deferred loan 
and grant 
Funds for tenant and sponsor-based rental assistance, 
operating subsidies, acquisition, rehabilitation, development 
or construction for permanent supportive housing for 
households experiencing long-term homelessness 
Economic Development 
and Housing Challenge 
Program  
Deferred loan Provides loans for housing which will support economic 
development activities or job creation/retention.  Fifty percent 
of funding must be awarded to proposals with non-state 
resources (local governments, philanthropic, religious, or 
charitable contribution(s)). 
Home Rental 
Rehabilitation 
Deferred loan Federal HOME funds for the rehabilitation of existing rental 
properties in MHFA‘s jurisdiction area.  No interest deferred 
loan.  5-year forgivable loan available for requests less than 
$100,000. 
Publicly Owned 
Housing Program 
Deferred loan Provides funds for development, construction, acquisition, 
and/or rehabilitation.  Reserves, operating expenses, and 
certain costs cannot be financed with state bonds. 
Rental Rehabilitation 
Loan Program 
Amortizing 
loan 
Funds for rehabilitation loans for existing rental properties 
utilizing authorized local lenders 
Bridges Grant Rental assistance grant for persons with serious mental illness 
waiting for a permanent housing subsidy 
Family Homelessness 
Prevention and 
Assistance Program 
(FHPAP) 
Grant A flexible grant program designed to assist families, youth, 
and single adults who are homeless or are at risk of 
homelessness 
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501c(3) Bonds Deferred loan Development, construction, acquisition, and rehabilitation of 
low-income rental housing primarily for long-term homeless 
households.  At least 90% of the units financed with 501©(3) 
Bonds must serve long-term homeless households and those 
at significant risk of long-term homelessness.  The remaining 
10% can serve homeless households or those at risk of 
homelessness. 
Non-Profit Capacity 
Building Revolving 
Loan Program 
Short term 
pre-
development 
loan 
Funds for predevelopment costs in conjunction with the 
development of low and moderate-income housing 
Family Housing Fund Deferred loan Funds for the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area.  
Priority will be given to developments or redevelopment 
projects that provide supportive housing for families with 
children, projects that create affordable, healthier, more 
energy-efficient housing through implementing the Minnesota 
Green Communities criteria and/or projects that create 
housing with strong linkages to jobs and/or transit 
Local Housing 
Incentives Account – 
Metropolitan Council 
Grant Funds for the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area.  
Grants may only be awarded to cities, which in turn pass the 
fund through to assist affordable housing developments. 
(Information quoted from MHFA 2009b) 
 
Major Programs for Ownership Housing Development in Hennepin County 
Program Name  Providing 
Agency 
Description 
Minnesota Mortgage 
Program 
MHFA Loan for low- and moderate-income first-time homebuyers 
with possibility of a deferred, zero interest loan to cover 
closing costs and the down payment 
Community Activity 
Set-Aside Program 
MHFA Loan for low- and moderate-income first-time homebuyers 
Home Ownership 
Assistance Fund 
MHFA Deferred, zero interest loan to cover closing costs and down 
payment for households earning below 60 percent of the AMI 
HOME Homeowner 
Entry Loan Program 
MHFA Deferred, zero interest loan to cover closing costs and down 
payment for low- and moderate-income households buying a 
home in targeted zip codes 
Homeownership 
Opportunity Program 
MHFA Loan for moderate income households to purchase and 
rehabilitate vacant homes or homes on verge of foreclosure 
Land Trusts West Hennepin 
Affordable 
Housing Land 
Trust 
Agency purchases land and low- or moderate-income 
household purchases house or both parties take a share in both 
land and house and sign agreement dividing any returns when 
house is sold; keeps house affordable for owner-occupants 
because they are insulated from land value appreciation 
Non-profit provision 
of affordable 
ownership units 
Non-profit 
agencies (e.g. 
Habitat for 
Humanity) 
Organizations provide affordable ownership units 
(Sources:  Homes Within Reach 2009; MHFA 2009a) 
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Appendix Two:  Sample Interview Questions 
 
1)  Can you tell me about your involvement in -------- city government? 
 -Why did you originally decide to get involved? 
 -What influence, if any, did housing affordability have for you? 
 
2)  Why has the city council decided to make developing affordable housing a top/low 
priority? 
 -Do current residents demand that policy? 
 
3)  How high is the demand for affordable housing in --------? 
 
4)  What groups are most active in pushing for affordable housing development in --------? 
 -What role do businesses play? 
 -What role do residents play? 
 -What role do non-profit organizations play? 
 
5)  What are the primary obstacles to developing affordable housing in --------? 
 -Is it possible to develop affordable housing without subsidies? 
 -How extensive is resident opposition to affordable housing? 
 -Why do you think some residents appear to strongly desire affordable housing? 
 -How do environmental restrictions affect affordability? 
 
6)  (Questions relating to specific developments, policies, or portions of comprehensive 
plan) 
 
7)  How does the city finance affordable housing development? 
 
8)  How much power does the city have to influence developers to include affordable 
housing in their developments? 
 
9)  (Question related to tax base) 
 
10)  How would you compare resident opinions towards owner-occupied versus renter-
occupied affordable housing? 
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Appendix Three:  Complete Correlation Matrix 
 
 Percent 
affordable 
of new 
housing 
units 
Total 
percent 
affordable, 
2000 
Jobs 
proximity 
ratio 
Supply 
index 
Tax 
capacity 
per capita, 
2000 
Percent 
population 
growth, 
2000-2007 
Adjacent 
poverty 
Adjacent 
minority 
Median 
household 
income, 
2000 
Median 
owner-
occupied 
value, 
2000 
Median 
rent, 2000 
Percent 
affordable 
of new 
housing 
units 
1 .413** -.376* -.349* -.367* .248 -.139 -.168 -.294 -.402* -.277 
Total 
percent 
affordable, 
2000 
.413** 1 -.202 -.519** -.745** -.298 -.198 -.195 .730** -.767** -.551** 
Jobs 
proximity 
ratio 
-.376* -.202 1 .479** .426** -.476** -.210 -.076 .081 .285 .234 
Supply 
index 
-.349* -.519** .479** 1 .539** -.026 .209 .257 .217 .514** .167 
Tax 
capacity 
per capita, 
2000 
-.367* -.745** .426** .539** 1 -.071 .080 .043 .816** .898** .429** 
Percent 
population 
growth, 
2000-2007 
.248 -.298 -.476** -.026 -.071 1 .184 .202 .137 .016 -.077 
Adjacent 
poverty 
-.139 -.198 -.210 .209 .080 .184 1 .784** .100 .162 -.045 
Adjacent 
minority 
-.168 -.195 -.076 .257 .043 .202 .784** 1 .083 .123 .005 
Median 
household 
income, 
2000 
-.294 -.730** .081 .217 .816** .137 .100 .083 1 .890** .465** 
Median 
owner-
occupied 
value, 
2000 
-.402 -.767** .285 .514** .898** .016 .162 .123 .890** 1 .479** 
Median 
rent, 2000 
-.227 -.551 .234 .167 .429** -.077 -.045 .005 .465** .479** 1 
* Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .01 level 
 
